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HEARSAY IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS: 
THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR CHANGE 
Arnold Rochvargt 
It is generally accepted that the rules of evidence which govern 
the admissibility of evidence in courtroom trials do not apply to 
administrative agency adjudications. J Maryland has followed this 
general rule since its early days of administrative hearings.2 
there are a few justifications for not requiring administrative 
agencies to be bound by the rules of evidence. First, the rules of 
evidence were developed for jury trials in order to keep unreliable 
evidence from influencing lay jurors.3 Because administrative hearings 
t Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D., George Washington University School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Steven P. Grossman for his comments on early drafts of 
this article, and John Sayles for his research assistance. 
1. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.2 (3d ed. 1991) (describing 
this as a "hornbook rule"); see also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 
312 U.S. 126, amended, 312 U.S. 654 (1941); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 
174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); In re Kennedy, 
472 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Del. 1984). 
2. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). Maryland, like 
many states, has codified this principle. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-
208(a) (1984); cj. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-105(4) (1990); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 50-13-15 (1990); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 24.275 (West 1981); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 28-32-06 (1974 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-10 
(1988); TEX. REv. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, sec. 14(a) (West Supp. 1993); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-2 (1986). 
3. See Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 689, 693-97 (1962) [hereinafter Davis, Hearsay]; Kenneth C. Davis, 
The Residuum Rule in Administrative Law, 28 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1 (1955) 
[hereinafter Davis, Residuum Rule]; Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to 
Problems oj Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 
376 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems oj Evidence]; Ernest Gellhorn, Rules 
oj Evidence in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 14; Leonard 
M. Simon, Note, The Weight to be Given Hearsay Evidence by Administrative 
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are not heard by juries,4 but rather by persons with legal expertise, 
there is no need to apply the rules of evidence. S Second, it has been 
argued that to require an administrative law judge or any presiding 
officer to reject inadmissible evidence "makes no sense"6 because 
there is no jury to protect and the agency official is "equally exposed 
to the evidence whether he admits it or excludes it."7 A third 
justification depends not on the absence of a jury in the administra-
tive process, but on the nature of the administrative· process itself 
and the reason for its existence. Administrative agencies further policy 
goals that the legislature has decided can be best promoted through 
a more efficient and speedy process than is available in the traditional 
judicial arena.8 It has been stated that a "major reason for the 
creation of workmen's compensation commissions was to avoid the 
costly and often impossible burden of the hearsay rule."9 Because 
application of the rules of evidence would be contrary to the goals 
of the administrative process, they should not apply in administrative 
hearings. 10 
Agencies: The Legal Residuum Rule, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265 (1960); Eugene 
J. Jeka, Note, Hearsay Evidence Held Admissible but Insubstantial in a Social 
Security Hearing, 1 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 162 (1970); Mary J. Morris, Note, 
Extent to Which Hearsay Evidence May Constitute Basis for A ward by Work-
men's Compensation Commission, 42 MICH. L. REv. 154, 156 (1943); George 
P. Faines, Note, Recent Decision: Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981), 20 DUQ. L. REv. 343, 362 (1982); 
Note, Hearsay - Admissibility Before Administrative Boards, 37 YALE L.J. 
993, 994 (1927). 
4. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 
U.S. 442 (1977). 
5. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 3; Davis, Problems of Evid.ence, 
supra note 3, at 371; Simon, supra note 3, at 265. It has also been suggested 
that the rules of evidence were developed for jury trials because juries could 
not be trusted to read long documents. Thus, the evidentiary rules which place 
emphasis on live oral testimony are aimed at requiring the jury to properly 
consider the evidence, a purpose inapplicable to administrative hearings. Davis, 
Problems of Evidence, supra note 3, at 397. 
6. See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 14. 
7. Id.; see also Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (9th Cir. 
1942). This argument may justify the distinction between following the rules 
of evidence in jury trials and not following them in administrative hearings. It 
does not, however, explain why judges who hear cases without juries are bound 
to follow the rules of evidence. See Pamela S. Sellnow, Note, Administrative 
Adjudication: Effect of the New Texas Rules of Evidence, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 
361 (1983). 
8. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. 1981). 
9. Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 6. 
10. There is, however, opposition to the majority view. See Spaulding v. Howlett, 
375 N.E.2d 47 (III. App. Ct. 1978) (stating hearsay generally not admissible in 
Illinois administrative proceedings); Douglas M. Wyckoff, Evidentiary Stan-
dards in Formal Administrative Proceedings, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1990, at 67 
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Because the rules of evidence applicable in trials do· not apply 
in administrative adjudications, the admission of evidence at an 
administrative hearing that would not be admissible at a trial does 
not constitute grounds for reversal. lI One of the more significant 
consequences of this is that hearsay is not excluded at administrative 
hearings. 12 Just because the agency decision is immune from attack 
on the issue of admissibility, however, does not mean that the agency 
decision cannot be attacked on the basis of the evidentiary record. 
All agency adjudicatory decisions must be supported by sub-
stantial evidencel3 and must comport with due process. 14 The sub-
stantial evidence requirement and due process considerations pose 
special problems when an agency decision is based solely on hearsay. 
"Substantial evidence" requires that the agency record contain suf-
ficient relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support the agency conclusion.ls In order to satisfy this 
reasonableness test, the evidence must be not only probative, but 
also reliable. 16 There are inherent impediments, however, towards 
(suggesting that the Florida Evidence Code should apply to administrative 
hearings); see also Thomas R. Mubroy, Jr. & Douglas G. McClure, The Case 
for Allowing Hearsay in Illinois Administrative Proceedings, ILL. B.J., June 
1989, at 552. 
11. This does not mean, however, that agencies must admit all evidence offered. 
Pursuant to Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act, the agency may exclude 
evidence that is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious. MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-208(c) (1984); see also Administrative Procedure 
Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) ("[T)he agency as a matter of policy shall 
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious 
evidence."); Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 4-212(a), 15 U.L.A. 
86 (1981) ("[U)pon proper objection, the presiding officer shall exclude evidence 
that is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious or excusable on constitutional 
or statutory grounds or on the basis of evidentiary privilege recognized in the 
courts of this state. "). 
12. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 4-212(a), 15 V.L.A. 86 (1981); 
Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, Rules of Procedure, COMAR 
28.02.01.18(C) (1992) [hereinafter OAH Rules of Procedure); see also OAH 
Rules of Procedure, COMAR 28.02.01.15(B) (1992) (authorizing an adminis-
trative law judge to admit an affidavit as evidence). 
13. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-215(g)(3)(v) (1984); see also Administrative 
Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988); Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act § 5-116(c)(7), 15 U.L.A. 127 (1981). 
14. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 1O-215(g)(3)(i) (1984); see also Administrative 
Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1988); Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act § 5-116(c)(1), -15 U.L.A. 127 (1981). 
15. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); American 
Radio-Tel. Servo v. Public Servo Comm'n, 33 Md. App. 423, 433, 365 A.2d 
314, 319 (1976). 
16. See Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 
573, 598, 565 A.2d 1015, 1027 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); see 
also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoe. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
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evaluating evidence that consists solely of hearsay, for there is no 
opportunity to test the evidence through cross-examination.17 More-
over, cross-examination is part of the due process required in ad-
ministrative hearings. IS 
Because of the tension between the substantial evidence require-
ment and the right of cross-examination on the one hand, and an 
agency's obligation to admit hearsay evidence on the other, courts 
subject administrative agency decisions based solely on hearsay to 
"exacting scrutiny."19 Therefore, although an administrative agency's 
decision will not be reversed because of the admission of hearsay, 
administrative decisions based solely on hearsay may be reversed due 
to lack of adequate evidentiary support. 20 
The purpose of this Article is to review and analyze the role of 
hearsay in Maryland state agency adjudications. The Article first 
discusses early Maryland cases addressing the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence at de novo appeals of agency decisions.21 The discussion 
then proceeds to later Maryland cases, where the early admissibility 
standards were applied to assess the sufficiency of hearsay directly 
at the agency adjudication level. 
The analysis will show that although the Maryland courts have 
usually recognized the problems raised by reliance on hearsay, they 
have nonetheless failed to develop a uniform analytical approach 
towards the treatment of hearsay. The courts' haphazard approach 
has given rise to largely superficial opinions, and has created incon-
(providing parameters for admissibility of out of court statements of child 
abuse victims). 
17. ladallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment, 476 A.2d 671, 678 
(D.C. 1984). The Jadallah court noted that when hearsay is presented, the 
agency "will not be able fully to explore and evaluate shortcomings in the 
original declarant's perception, memory and veracity as well as any defect in 
the transmission of information between the original declarant and the testifying 
witness." [d. 
18. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-208(e)(3) (1984); Colorado Dep't of 
Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16,21 (Colo. 1987); Dragen v. Connecticut Medical 
Exam. Bd., 591 A.2d 150, 153 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Cassella v. Civil Servo 
Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Tron V. Prince George's 
County, 69 Md. App. 256, 262, 517 A.2d 113, 116 (1986); Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. V. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1981). 
19. Lim V. Taxicab Comm'n, 564 A.2d 720, 724 (D.C. 1989); see also Nat Stern, 
The Substantial Evidence Rule in Administrative Proceedings: Restrictions on 
the Use of Hearsay Since Richardson V. Perales, 36 ARK. L. REv. 102, 110-
11, 116 (1982). " 
20. See Martin V. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement Bd., 532 
A.2d 102, 109 (D.C. 1987); Longe V. Department of Employment Sec., 380 
A.2d 76, 78 (Vt. 1977); Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 694-95. 
21. For a discussion of the appeals process in early administrative adjudications, 
see Reuben Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 MD. L. REv. 
185, 206-10 (1938). . 
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sistent case law. Moreover, the failure to articulate a consistent 
analysis has denied litigants, presiding officers, and administrative 
agencies proper guidance on the role of hearsay in administrative 
adjudications. 
After analyzing Maryland precedent, the Article develops an 
analytical framework around which administrative decisions based 
on hearsay can be evaluated. The foundation of this framework is 
the recognition that, because the nature and function of state agencies 
differ from one to another, the role of hearsay may similarly differ 
among the agencies. To properly account for the variance among 
agencies, the Article concludes that administrative guidelines for 
hearsay should be developed for each agency's adjudicative process. 
THE EARLY YEARS (1916-1938) 
Administrative adjudications first became a significant feature 
of the legal landscape with the enactment of workers' compensation 
statutes during the first few decades of the twentieth century. 22 These 
statutes created special administrative tribunals to provide compen-
sation to workers who were accidentally injured on the job. In order 
to further this policy, the common law defenses of assumption of 
risk, contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule were abol-
ished.23 Moreover, the workers' compensation statutes provided that 
the common law and statutory rules of evidence would not apply at 
the agency hearings. 24 This statutory abolition of the rules of evidence 
gave birth to a debate on the proper role of hearsay in administrative 
adjudications. 
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice CO.,25 a 1916 New York case, is 
generally considered to be the first major case dealing with hearsay 
and administrative hearings. 26 Carroll was an appeal by the Knick-
erbocker Ice Company following a commission's award of workers' 
compensation to the plaintiff. The case involved Myles Carroll, an 
ice deliveryman who died, allegedly, from the effects of a 300 pound 
block of ice falling upon him. The only evidence offered at the 
commission hearing proving that the accident had occurred, however, 
22. Maryland's workers' compensation law was enacted in 1914. See General 
Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 72, 555 A.2d 542, 544 (1989). 
23. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1.10, 1.20, 
4.30-4.50, 5.20 (1991). 
24. See Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 252-53, 127 A. 850, 851 (1925); 
see also Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 61; 2B LARSON, supra note 23, § 79.30. 
25. 113 N.B. 507 (N.Y; 1916). 
26. In fact, there had been an earlier case from Michigan, Reck v. Whittles berger , 
148 N.W. 247 (Mich. 1914). Carroll, however, is generally regarded as the 
leading case in this area. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, §§ 7.2, 7.4; Morris, 
supra note 3, at 155; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 1. 
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was hearsay. Specifically, Carroll's widow, a neighbor, a treating 
phySician, and physicians at the hospital each testified that Carroll 
had told them about the accident. Conversely, Carroll's helper on 
the ice wagon and two employees of the saloon where the accident 
allegedly occurred testified that they were present when and where 
the decedent was allegedly injured, but had seen no such accident. 
Moreover, physicians who had examined Carroll testified that they 
had found no bruises, discolorations or abrasions on Carroll's body. 
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the commission's 
finding that Carroll had died from a work related injury and that 
his widow was entitled to benefits under the statute. The court 
recognized that the legislature had abolished the rules of evidence 
for workers' compensation cases, and that the agency decision could 
not be "overturned on account of any alleged error in receiving 
evidence."27 Emphasizing, however, that an award had to be sup-
ported by some competent (i.e. nonhearsay) evidence, the court 
devised what has become known as the legal residuum rule. The legal 
residuum rule mandates that there must be "a residuum of legal 
evidence to support the claim before an award can be made.' '28 
Because substantial evidence supported the view that no accident had 
occurred, the award was reversed. 29 
The Carroll legal residuum rule became the standard for other 
state courts when deciding the proper role of hearsay in agency 
hearings. 30 By 1925, the legal residuum rule had been adopted in at 
least six states31 and had been rejected by none. As opposed to 
Carroll, Maryland's early cases pertaining to the role of hearsay in 
administrative hearings did not concern themselves with hearsay 
27. Carroll, 113 N.E. at 508. 
28. Id. at 509. 
29. Id. The majority opinion represented the views of four of the seven judges of 
the Court of Appeals of New York. One concurring judge thought that it was 
possible for hearsay to support a finding without some nonhearsay in the 
record, but that in this case the award could not stand because the hearsay 
was directly contradicted. Id. (Bartlett, C.J., concurring). In his dissent, Judge 
Seabury stated that in light of the "social benefit which the law was designed 
to promote," the decision could be based solely on hearsay as long as it was 
"trustworthy." Id. at 509-11 (Seabury, J., dissenting). 
30. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 7.4; see also Brewerton Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 154 N.E. 412 (III. 1926); Swim v. Central Fuel Co., 215 N.W. 603 
(Iowa 1927); Strout's Case, 140 A. 377 (Me. 1928). ' 
31. By 1925, the legal residuum rule had been adopted in Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Utah. See Royal v. Hawkeye Portland Cement 
Co., 192 N.W. 406 (Iowa 1923); Valentine v. Weaver, 228 S.W. 1036 (Ky. 
1921); Kelly's Case, 122 A. 580 (Me. 1923); Beck v. Whittlesberger, 148 N.W. 
247 (Mich. 1914); Riley v. Carnegie Steel Co., 119 A. 832 (Pa. 1923); Garfield 
Smelting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 P. 57 (Utah 1918). 
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testimony presented at the agency level. Rather, these cases focused 
upon the admissibility of such hearsay when a party sought to 
introduce it at the de novo trial court review of the agency decisionY 
The first Maryland case to discuss the proper role of hearsay in 
the agency hearing process was Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey.J3 Mealey 
was a workers' compensation case with facts similar to those in 
Carroll. Mr. Mealey delivered oil before dying of leukemia. It was 
alleged that the leukemia was aggravated by an accidental injury 
suffered during an oil delivery. Although there were no signs of any 
bruises on Mr. Mealey, Mr. Mealey's widow, his building superin-
tendent, and three doctors who had treated him just before his death 
testified that Mealey had told each of them that he had slipped and 
hit his left side on his delivery wagon.34 Mealey prevailed at the 
agency level, and on de novo appeal the trial court admitted the 
hearsay evidence pertaining to Mr. Mealey's alleged workplace injury. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first stated that because the 
rules of evidence were developed for jury trials, it could not be 
expected that administrative hearing commissions could adhere to 
them.3s Furthermore, the court noted that the Maryland Workmen's 
Compensation Act expressly provided that the commission was not 
bound by the rules of evidence. 36 The Mealey court then discussed 
Carroll, wherein a similar provision in New York's workers' com-
pensation statute was interpreted as permitting hearsay to be con sid-
ered by the commission; but barring an award from being based on 
hearsay alone. The Maryland court also recognized that the Carroll 
approach had been followed in six other states.J7 
Nevertheless, the Mealey court elected not to follow the Carroll 
approach, holding instead that because of the "increased latitude 
allowed to the Commission," the courts must "adapt" the procedures 
involving the admissibility of evidence as long as there is an "assur-
ance of reliability."38 The court then held that even though hearsay 
was the only evidence of the accidental nature of the injury, the 
32. Review of workers' compensation cases is still de novo. See General Motors 
Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 555 A.2d 542 (1989). 
33. 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). 
34. [d. at 251-52, 127 A. at 851. 
35. [d. at 252, 127 A. at 851". At the time, section 10 of the Maryland Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 3 Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art. 101, provided that "[t]he 
commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules 
of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure . . . but may 
make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to 
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit 
of this act." [d. at 252-53,127 A. at 851. 
36. [d. at 252-53, 127 A. at 851. 
37. [d. at 253, 127 A. at 851. 
38. [d. at 254, 127 A. at 851. 
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commission's finding that the fall had occurred was sufficiently 
supported. The court's holding was based on two factors: the number 
of witnesses who had testified as to the same event and that the 
hearsay concerned a simple fact with "no room for substantial 
misunderstanding. "39 
The Mealey decision led Maryland on a path different from 
other states in the early years of administrative law. Not until more 
than fifty years later did a significant number of other states join 
Maryland in rejecting CarroWs legal residuum rule. By forging a new 
path at this early date, however, Maryland courts could not look to 
other state opinions for assistance in dealing with the proper role of 
hearsay absent a legal residuum requirement. Because Maryland has 
such a long history on this issue, a close analysis of its hearsay and 
administrative adjudication cases is useful to illuminate not only the 
present state of the law in Maryland, but also to aid in understanding 
cases from other states which have more recently rejected the legal 
residuum rule. 
There are a few criticisms of Mealey. The first is that although 
the court adopted a reliability test as the appropriate test, it did not 
distinguish between the reliability of the testimony of the different 
witnesses. For example, the testimony of the doctors should have 
been viewed as more reliable than the testimony from the widow or 
superintendent because statements to treating physicians by patients 
are more likely to be truthful due to the patient's interest in receiving 
proper medical care.40 Moreover, unlike the widow, the doctors were 
disinterested persons in this compensation hearing. The testimony of 
disinterested witnesses about hearsay statements should be viewed as 
more reliable than testimony from interested persons.41 
A second criticism of Mealey is that the court was persuaded 
that the hearsay was reliable because it concerned a simple fact with 
no room for misunderstanding.42 This, however, confuses the issue, 
for the focus ought not to be on whether Mr. Mealey's widow 
correctly reported what her husband told her, but rather whether 
Mr. Mealey's statement was true. The simplicity of the factual 
component of the statement may support the position that Mrs. 
39. [d. at 255, 127 A. at 852. 
40. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 
(1989 & Supp. 1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); Maryland 
Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589-90, 
565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277 (John W. 
Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. 
41. This is primarily a matter of credibility, see, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 
40, § 39, but is also related to the hearsay reliability issues of the witness's 
perception and memory of the out-of-hearing statements, id. § 245. 
42. Standard Oil CO. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 255, 127 A. 850, 852 (1925). 
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Mealey did not inaccurately report her conversation with her husband, 
but this was not especially crucial in light of the fact that she testified 
in person and was subject to cross-examination. The real problem 
with hearsay evidence arises when it is offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. Because the hearsay in Mealey was introduced 
to prove the assertion that there had been a fall, the simplicity of 
the statement does not prove its reliability. 
Two years after the decision in Mealey, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland heard Standard Gas Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin.43 
Baldwin involved a death certificate signed by a coroner that listed 
the cause of death as heart disease, aggravated by burns caused by 
an accidental fall on hot metal. 44 The death certificate was the only 
evidence linking Mr. Baldwin's death to an injury suffered while 
working as an iron molder. The health department had been told 
this information by the deceased's widow.45 
In deciding Baldwin, the Court of Appeals of Maryland first 
noted that, although the report would not be admissible under the 
rules of evidence, Mealey had relaxed the use of hearsay in the 
review of workers' compensation cases. Nonetheless, the reviewing 
court still had a duty to review the administrative decision for 
sufficiency of evidence. The court of appeals found that the evidence 
had "no probative value" because it "lacked the indicia of reliabil-
itY,"46 and therefore, "should have been excluded. "47 
There are various criticisms that can be made of Baldwin. The 
major criticism is that its conclusion was reached without any anal-
ysis. Although the court of appeals said that it was employing a 
reliability test, there was no discussion of the reliability issue. For 
example, the court did not recognize that the evidence was in fact 
double hearsay which requires an evaluation of the reliability of each 
layer of hearsay. 48 Moreover, the court seemed to be confusing 
probative value and reliability. Evidence is probative if it is relevant 
to the issue and is useful to either prove or disprove a fact;49 evidence 
43. 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927). 
44. The death certificate provided that "[tlhe cause of death was as follows: 
Valvular heart disease. Contributory - burns on body accidental resulting 
from fall (secondary) on hot metal." [d. at 326, 136 A. at 646. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. See FED. R. EVID. 805; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 324.1; Porter v. 
District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 518 A.2d 1020, 1025 n.3 
(D.C. 1986); Longe v. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76, 79 (Vt. 
1977). 
49. Relevant evidence has been defined in the following way. One fact is relevant 
to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the 
existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders 
10 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
which is not probative may be excluded at an agency adjudication. 50 
Conversely, reliability pertains not to relevancy, but rather to credi-
bility, and whether the evidence is worthy of belief. 51 Whereas it is 
possible that evidence may be probative but not reliable, or reliable 
but not probative, the Baldwin court improperly treated reliability 
and probative value as synonymous. 
Despite these criticisms, the conclusion reached in Baldwin seems 
correct. Unlike in Mealy, the widow did not testify about how she 
learned of the accident. It is clear she was not at the worksite; 
therefore, she had to have been told of the accident by some third 
person. Although fellow workers were present, none actually wit-
nessed the accident. 52 Furthermore, Baldwin's widow did not testify 
and was not subject to cross-examination about the basis of the 
report. Moreover, unlike in Mealy, the deceased never was able to 
tell anyone about the accident. Mr. Baldwin was apparently uncon-
scious from the time of his heart attack until his death, so there 
were no statements made to any treating physicians. 53. Therefore, 
although the court's analysis in Baldwin is not helpful, a close 
examination of the facts provides support for its conclusion. 
Similar to Mealy, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylo,.s4 involved 
using a deceased worker's statements to prove that death resulted 
from an accidental work related injury. Hearsay testimony from both 
Traylor's widow and his landlady alleged that he had been exposed 
to carbon monoxide while repairing a gasoline engine at his employ-
er's plant. Additionally, there was eyewitness testimony as to the 
the existence of the other either certain or more probable. Miko v. Committee 
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 596 A.2d 396, 406 (Conn. 1991) (citing 
State v. McClendon, 505 A.2d 685,687 (Conn. 1986». Evidence is "probative" 
when it has the tendency "to establish the proposition that it is offered to 
prove .... Evidence that is probative often is said to have 'logical relevance.''' 
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 185. 
50. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 1O-208(b) to 1O-208(c) (1984). 
51. Reliable evidence has been defined as the kind of evidence which responsible 
persons are accustomed to rely upon in serious affairs. It is evidence that is 
intrinsically trustworthy. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 353. 
52. Baldwin's fellow employee, Herman Roffles, was present at the time of the 
alleged accident. He testified: 
I was sitting down watching some metal in the process of melting in 
a furnace . . . . Mr. Baldwin came past . . . . I took my eye off of 
him to look at the furnace, and as I did some one [sic] hollered, and 
I immediately looked around, and I saw Mr. Baldwin in a sitting 
position. 
Standard Gas Equip. Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 328, 136 A. 644, 647 
(1927). 
53. Baldwin, 152 Md. at 323-24, 136 A. at 645. Baldwin was carried to the hospital, 
but was pronounced dead on arrival. Id. 
54. 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1929). 
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carbon monoxide exposure. The court ruled that the hearsay was 
"merely cumulative, "55 and therefore upheld the commission's award. 
It is not clear whether Traylor employed the earlier reliability 
test or a new harmless error approach. Because other witnesses 
testified as to their personal observation of the gas exposure, the 
hearsay was merely cumulative; the hearsay, therefore, need not have 
been relied upon to prove the accident. Although it might be seen 
as "harmless" to consider hearsay that merely repeats eyewitness 
testimony,56 one might question how "harmless" it was when used 
to evaluate the credibility of other witnessesY To the extent that 
Traylor does develop a harmless error approach, this limitation 
should be recognized. 
Conversely, Traylor is perhaps better seen as merely an appli-
cation of Mealey's reliability test. It has been argued that hearsay is 
reliable if supported by nonhearsay. 58 The hearsay in Traylor thus 
manifested indicia of reliability because it was consistent with eye-
witness accounts. Another argument in support of Traylor is that, 
unlike in Baldwin, there was a disinterested witness - the landlady. 
Testimony of disinterested witnesses is generally viewed as more 
reliable than testimony from witnesses who have an interest in the 
matter. Moreover, both the landlady and the widow were available 
for cross-examination . 
. In Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm,59 hearsay 
testimony was offered by a deceased worker's widow. Apparently, 
the widow had been told before her husband's death that he had 
been injured while mining coal. As in Traylor, there were also 
eyewitnesses to the accidental injury. Nonetheless, the widow's claim 
was disallowed by the commission. The reviewing court, however, 
passing judgment on the same hearsay evidence heard by the com-
mission, reversed. Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals 
stated that while some hearsay might have to be excluded as unworthy 
of reliance, "nothing in the hearsay evidence in the present record 
... would have required its exclusion" for it added "little more" 
55. [d. at 124, 130, 148 A. at 249, 252. 
56. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). 
57. See Langlois v. Department of Employment Training, 546 A.2d 1365, 1370 
(Vt. 1988). This concern applies not only to hearsay, but also whenever harmless 
error is argued. See generally Charles F. Campbell, An Economic View oj 
Developments in the Harmless Error and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L. 
REv. 499 (1990). 
58. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Hentges v. 
Bartach, 533 P.2d 66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Unemployment Compensation 
Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981); Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 
3, at 6. 
59. 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932). 
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than the testimony of eyewitnesses.60 The court pointed out that 
although there was no need to have received hearsay that merely 
duplicated the direct evidence, this turned out to be "unimportant. "61 
More persuasive to the court was that, as in Mealey, the hearsay 
referred to a "single fact and a simple occurrence. "62 The court also 
rejected the argument that hearsay in general is inherently more 
subject to falsity than direct evidence.63 
On one level, Chisholm might be viewed as merely an application 
of Mealey, for the hearsay was consistent with direct evidence and 
the subject matter of the hearsay was relatively simple. Therefore, 
the same criticisms directed towards Mealey also apply to Chisholm. 64 
Chisholm's import, however, extends significantly beyond Mealey, 
for it is the first case discussing the need for hearsay based on the 
availability of nonhearsay. 6S Although this has been discussed by 
later courts and commentators as especially relevant,66 the Chisholm 
court did not believe it to be significant in reaching its decision. 67 
Chisholm is also significant in its rejection of the notion that 
all hearsay is inherently more unreliable than direct evidence. This 
position later became a focus of those who argued against the legal 
residuum rule in other states.68 
60. [d. at 53, 161 A. at 278. The court noted that although it was a novelty to 
discriminate between hearsay, this process was not entirely new. [d. 
61. [d. at 54, 161 A. at 278. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. The court stated that "there is of course, danger of falsity in thus 
reproducing statements, but hardly any greater danger than there is of falsity 
in the testimony of eyewitnesses." [d. 
64. See discussion supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
65. See Chisholm, 163 Md. at 54, 161 A. at 278. 
66. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. 
denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1939); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 
913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); ludallah V. District of Columbia Dep't of Em-
ployment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 678 (D.C. 1984); Wallace V. District Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd., 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972); Embers of 
Salisbury, Inc. V. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 835 
(Mass. 1988) (Lynch, 1., dissenting); Unemployment Compensation Bd. V. 
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981); Ronald K. L. Collins, Hearsay and the 
Administrative Process: A Review. and Reconsideration oj the State oj the Law 
oj Certain Evidentiary Procedures Applicable in California Administrative 
Proceedings, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 577,645-46 (1976); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 
19-22. 
67. Chisholm, 163 Md. at 54, 161 A. at 278. The court stated "[t)he remaining 
part of the hearsay . . . seems to us not to be so unsafe and unreliable as a 
basis for the adjudication that the jury should not have been permitted to 
consider it." [d. 
68. See Cassella, 494 A.2d at 914; Ceja, 427 A.2d at 637-38; Collins, supra note 
66, at 613; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5; leka, supra note 3, at 
162. 
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In Horn Ice Cream v. Yost,69 the mother of a deceased worker 
testified as to the accidental nature of the injury which caused her 
son's death. Relying on Traylor and Chisholm, the court in Yost 
found no reversible error because the hearsay added little more than 
had been given by eyewitnesses. The court did not identify whether 
it was viewing the cumulative nature of the hearsay as relating to its 
reliability or the harmlessness of its use, although its statement that 
"it is not apparent how the ruling could have injured appellants"70 
adds more support to a harmless error theory. The same criticism of 
a harmless error approach made in regard to the Traylor opinion 
would also apply here.71 
Another case, Dembeck v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 72 in-
volved a medical report prepared by a Dr. Bay, the medical examiner 
and advisor to the State Industrial Accident Commission, who had 
examined Mr. Dembeck. The report was submitted after the hearing, 
but prior to the final decision of the commission. The commission 
suspended Dembeck's benefits, a holding affirmed by the trial-level 
reviewing court. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
decision to suspend benefits because "no opportunity was afforded 
the claimant to interrogate Dr. Bay as to the report or cross-examine 
him. "73 This, the court wrote, denied Dembeck his right "to be 
confronted with the witnesses against [him], and an opportunity to 
test the correctness or truthfulness of the evidence by cross-exami-
nation. "74 The court also stated that justice requires that "the parties 
be informed of the source of the information against them and be 
given the opportunity to prove the information is not true. "75 Even 
though Dr. Bay's report seemed to be nothing more than cumulative 
testimony to that offered by Dembeck, reversal was still warranted 
because the court had "no way of determining the effect or the 
additional weight given by the commission" to the report since "it 
was made by an employee of the commission who was supposed to 
be, and doubtless was, entirely disinterested and impartial. "76 
Although Dembeck may be best explained on the basis of a 
violation of the exclusiveness of the record doctrine," it has been 
69. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933). 
70. [d. at 30, 163 A. at 825. 
71. See discussion supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
72. 166 Md. 21, 170 A. 158 (1934). 
73. [d. at 27, 170 A. at 160. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 28, 170 A. at 160. 
76. [d. 
77. The doctrine of exclusiveness of the record has been explained as follows: 
Where a hearing is prescribed by statute, nothing must be taken into 
account by the administrative tribunal in arriving at its determination 
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cited subsequently as a hearsay case,78 and therefore raises various 
issues involving hearsay. Even though the hearsay was cumulative, 
unlike earlier cases, Dembeck rejected a harmless error approach. In 
Dembeck there was· recognition that hearsay could tip the balance if 
there is conflicting direct evidence. Dembeck also has very broad 
language concerning a claimant's right of cross-examination and 
confrontation, which, if taken literally, would severely limit the use 
of hearsay at agency hearings. This concern of the Dembeck court 
had not been evident from earlier opinions. Moreover, the court's 
discussion of whether the witnesses were disinterested was a new 
approach. In Dembeck, because the hearsay was from a disinterested 
witness, the court was unwilling to view the hearsay as harmless. In 
earlier cases, the fact that the hearsay came from a disinterested 
witness indicated its reliability. 79 It should be noted, however, that 
reliability was not the major concern of the court in Dembeck. In 
general, Dembeck is much narrower than earlier Maryland cases, 
and, as will be seen, is much 'narrower than later cases. Its validity, 
however, has never been questioned by subsequent Maryland opi-
nions. 
Spence v. Bethlehem Steel CO.80 again involved a worker who 
died after alleged accidental exposure to poisonous gas. The evidence 
in the record relating to the alleged accident were statements made 
by the deceased worker to his wife and testimony by an examining 
physician that the worker had said that he had been poisoned. The 
employer offered no evidence to refute that an accident occurred. 
The court first noted that the "weight of authority ... seems to be 
that the statements of the patient as to, the cause of his condition or 
injury would not be admissible, "81 but that there was also authority 
for admitting such evidence when it related to the doctor's ability to 
diagnose and treat the case. 82 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
citing its earlier cases, stated that it "has allowed more latitude in 
the admission of statements in compensation cases of one injured, 
that has not been introduced in some manner into the record of the 
hearing .... Unless the principle is observed, the right to a hearing 
becomes meaningless. Of what real worth is the right to present 
evidence and to argue its significance at a formal hearing, if the one 
who decides the case may stray at will from the record in reaching 
his decision? 
Mazza v. Cavicchia, 105 A.2d 545,554 (N.J. 1954); see also MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV'T § 10-209 (1984). 
78. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 129, 314 A.2d 113, 115 
(1974). 
79. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930). 
80. 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938). 
81. [d. at 547, 197 A. at 305. 
82. [d. at 547, 197 A. at 306. 
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where death ensued, as to the cause of the injury.' '83 The court 
added that such hearsay "should be received with great caution" 
only from workers who are unavailable because of their death, and 
only if the statement had been made "so promptly after the alleged 
injury and so closely related to the facts and physical conditions as 
to give them substantial probative value.' '84. The court concludeo that 
it was appropriate in this case for the agency to rely upon both the 
testimony of the wife and doctor. 
Although not as narrow as Dembeck, Spence does take a nar-
rower approach to hearsay than that taken by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in its earliest cases. First, Spence reflects a' distrust of 
hearsay. Earlier, in Chisholm, the court expressly rejected the notion 
that hearsay is inherently more unreliable than nonhearsay. 85 More-
over, Spence permits reliance on hearsay only when the declarant is 
unavailable because of death. This also was not the rule of earlier 
cases. Spence also viewed reliability in light of the fact that the 
statement was made near the time of the injury. Despite these new 
considerations, Spence does mark a return to reliability as the court's 
major concern. 
Summary 
Between 1925 and 1938, Maryland rejected the legal residuum 
approach and adopted the rule that hearsay by itself could support 
an administrative decision as long as the reviewing court was assured 
of the hearsay's reliability. The earliest cases indicate that hearsay 
was more likely to be found reliable if the hearsay involved a simple 
fact not subject to misunderstanding, and if the hearsay was corrob-
orated by more than one witness, preferably one of whom was 
disinterested. The Maryland courts had also relied on harmless error 
to resolve the hearsay issue, but had written inconsistent opinions 
relating to harmless error. The judiciary had also considered the 
availability of the declarant, but it was not clear how important this 
was. The last two opinions during this period evidenced some hesi-
tation and concern about allowing agencies to rely on hearsay. 
THE MIDDLE YEARS (1950-1971) 
During the period after World War II until the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Richardson v. Perales86 in 1971, the legal 
83. Id. at 548, 197 A. at 306. 
84. Id. at 549-50, 197 A. at 307. 
85. Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 53, 161 A. 267, 
278 (1932); see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
86. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
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residuum rule was, despite scholarly criticism, the majority ap-
proachY Such criticism noted that the legal residuum rule failed to 
distinguish between reliable and unreliable hearsay. 88 Moreover, it 
was argued that the rule did not fully protect litigants because it 
allowed a small amount of nonhearsay to bootstrap a large amount 
of hearsay, 89 and likewise, that in applying the legal residuum rule, 
the courts seemed to always find some residuum of competent 
evidence.90 The central debate in the majority of states during this 
period - whether to abandon the legal residuum rule - was not 
relevant in Maryland because Maryland never adopted it. Despite 
having resolved the general issue that hearsay by itself could support 
an agency finding, however, Maryland courts still struggled in an 
attempt to find the appropriate balance between the administrative 
process's desire for efficiency and reliance on hearsay, and the parties' 
interest in a fair hearing. 
Nearly thirty years elapsed between the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's Spence opinion and its next significant opinion on hearsay 
and administrative hearings, Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny.91 
Factually and procedurally similar to many of its predecessors, Quasny 
involved the testimony of a widow concerning statements made to 
her by her husband prior to his death relating to an alleged work 
related injury. The widow's claim was allowed by the commission 
and affirmed by the trial-level reviewing court. The employer argued 
that Maryland's earlier line of cases established the rule that in order 
for the agency to rely on the hearsay, "there must be some other 
corroborative testimony, and the statement must refer to a simple 
fact and leave no room for substantial misunderstanding. "92 The 
Quasny court rejected this test and said that the court of appeals in 
its earlier cases had "been careful to formulate no binding rule. "93 
Quasny then concluded that, in this case, the widow's testimony had 
"substantial probative value."94 Although the husband's statement 
to his wife was made six to eight hours after the accident, the 
87. See 1 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 4(b), at 40-41 (3d ed. 1940); Collins, supra 
note 66, at 607; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 689. 
88. See Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 689; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 
3, at 4. 
89. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Cardillo, 106 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 
1939); Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 696; see also Unemployment Compen-
sation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981). 
90. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 30; Simon, supra note 3, at 276. 
But see Ptaszynski v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 114 N.E.2d 38 (N.Y. 1953). 
9l. 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967). 
92. [d. at 580, 227 A.2d at 24. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
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husband had not been physically able to make a statement until that 
time. The court also found it significant that the husband had been 
given last rites by a priest before speaking with his wife, and that 
the widow's testimony had not been contradicted. Moreover, the 
court found the explanation of the accident "coherent and plausi-
ble. "95 The court was not troubled by the lack of any evidence that 
corroborated the hearsay. 
The Quasny analysis, with its major focus on the reliability of 
the hearsay, is typical of the approach the Maryland courts took 
during the sixties and early seventies. In most of the cases during 
this period, however, the courts seemed to be very willing to find 
reliability. For example, the Quasny court emphasized the lack of 
contradictory evidence and downplayed the lack of corroboration, 
when in fact both stemmed from one common factor - that no one 
saw the accident. There also seemed to be no reason to find the 
widow's hearsay testimony reliable merely because it was "plausible" 
where other explanations, for example, that there had been no 
"accidental" injury, were equally plausible. Moreover, the court was 
influenced in its reliability finding by the administration of last rites 
even though there was no argument and thus no finding that the 
statement was a "dying declaration."96 Quasny is an excellent example 
of Maryland's liberal treatment of hearsay during the middle period. 
The next decision, Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore,97 was a 
zoning case involving whether a doctor's office could be located in 
a residential apartment building. The owner of the apartment house 
testified at the hearing that 95% of the doctor's patients lived in the 
immediate area. The owner claimed that he had been told this by 
the doctor, who was not present at the hearing. In permitting the 
zoning variance for the doctor's office, the zoning board expressly 
relied upon this 95070 figure. In reviewing the zoning board's decision, 
the court first cited Mealey and Quasny for the principle that hearsay 
that is "credible and has sufficient probative force" may serve as 
the basis of an administrative decision.98 In this case, the apartment 
owner's testimony "bore the indicia of reliability"99 because he had 
heard the doctor's claims several times, the doctor's statement was 
"simple and direct and not likely to have been misunderstood by the 
95. [d. at 581, 227 A.2d at 24. 
96. Dying declarations have long been held to be admissible in court as an exception 
to the hearsay rule because of their presumed reliability. See Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (citing Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 (1895) and 
Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881». 
97. 251 Md. 92, 246 A.2d 583 (1968). 
98. [d. at 97, 246 A.2d at 586. 
99. [d. at 98, 246 A.2d at 587. 
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hearer," 100 and it was not contradicted by the opposing party. 101 
The court's analysis in Neuman is conclusory and again reflects 
a very liberal approach towards the use of hearsay at administrative 
hearings. A less cursory approach, however, might have led to a 
diff~rent conclusion. A self-serving statement by a tenant to a land-
lord cannot be equated in terms of reliability to statements of injury 
made by a worker to a treating physician or even a spouse. There is 
nothing inherently reliable about statements made by tenants to 
landlords. Moreover, the fact that it was repeated several times did 
not prove the underlying reliability of the statement, for while the 
doctor may have honestly believed that 95% of his patients were 
from the area, cross-examination might have revealed that this figure 
was based on speculation or improper data. 
Properly framed, the issue in Neuman should not have been 
whether the apartment owner correctly testified as to what was 
reported to him (simple, direct and not misunderstood), but rather, 
whether the information related to him had a substantial basis in 
reality. This evidence was uniquely within the doctor's possession, 
yet he did not testify. The zoning variance opponents did not have 
access to the patient's addresses, and therefore should not have been 
faulted for not offering contradictory evidence. Nevertheless, the 
court had no problem upholding the agency's reliance on this testi-
mony. Neuman is perhaps the most liberal case allowing the use of 
hearsay. 
Eger v. Stone,t°2 another zoning case, involved a special exception 
request for a parking lot. A resident opposing the petition testified 
that she had investigated traffic accidents in the area; she further 
submitted a list of these accidents. The zoning board denied the 
special request, but the circuit court reversed, disregarding the resi-
dent's testimony because it was hearsay.103 The court of appeals, 
however, reversed the lower court and upheld the agency.I04 The Eger 
court wrote that the circuit court had issued its ruling before Neuman 
was decided, but that the court of appeals had recently decided that 
hearsay, "if credible and of sufficient probative force, may indeed 
be the sole basis" of an administrative decision. lOS Again, the Eger 
court took only a quick look at the hearsay, concluding that the 
resident's testimony was of "sufficient credibility and probative 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. 253 Md. 533, 253 A.2d 372 (1969). 
103. Id. at 541, 253 A.2d at 376. 
104. /d. at 542, 253 A.2d at 377. 
105. Id. 
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force"l06 because it supported expert testimony that the area posed 
a potential traffic hazard. 
Several points are worth noting here. First, the circuit court 
opinion could not be explained solely because it was drafted prior 
to Neuman because Neuman was not the first case to hold hearsay 
sufficient to support an agency finding. Rather, this became estab-
lished as the Maryland rule in Mealey in 1925. 107 Second, the Eger 
court seemed satisfied with the reliability of the hearsay merely 
because it complemented direct evidence. Other arguments for up-
holding the agency, however, seem more persuasive. For example, 
the accident reports were available from the police and were accessible 
to both parties. The resident who testified had merely gathered the 
data and testified to the fact that accidents had occurred. Accident 
reports are clearly reliable on that issue, if not on attribution of 
fault. Third, unlike in Neuman, the hearsay testimony was not subject 
to an attack on its reliability. Eger would have been more analogous 
to Neuman had the witness testified about a poll someone else had 
taken of which she knew only the results. Eger therefore was a much 
easier case than Neuman in which to uphold the use of hearsay. 
Redding v. Board of County CommissionerslO8 was the last 
Maryland decision dealing with hearsay and administrative hearings 
prior to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Richardson 
v. Perales. The Redding opinion is bare. Redding involved a dismissal 
hearing of a police officer where tape recordings were introduced 
into evidence. The court upheld the use of the hearsay noting that 
there had been no objection to the hearsay when it was introduced 
at the hearing. There is not much in Redding to analyze; the most 
significant feature of the opinion was the court's willingness to accept 
hearsay without regard for those issues that make hearsay evidence 
suspect. Redding gives the impression that by 1971 the Maryland 
court had reached the position that these hearsay cases did not merit 
much attention. 
Summary 
The case law in Maryland during the period 1967-1971 evidences 
a very liberal approach towards the use of hearsay by administrative 
agencies. The court in each case was very willing to rely on hearsay 
as the basis of an administrative decision without much analysis of 
the issue. Although the courts still cited the need to find reliability, 
they were lax in their scrutiny of the reliability issue. Moreover, the 
judiciary during this period eschewed any attempt to develop a 
106. [d. at 543, 253 A.2d at 377. 
107. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
108. 263 Md. 94, 282 A.2d 136 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972). 
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uniform set of rules for analyzing the hearsay issue, relying instead 
on an inconsistent case by case approach. The result was the accep-
tance of hearsay without much critical analysis of its reliability. It 
appears that some of the concerns expressed in earlier cases became 
subordinated to the desire of the court to promote an informal 
administrative process. 
THE MODERN PERIOD (t971-PRESENT) 
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court decided Richardson 
v. Peraies,Hy} which is generally now considered the leading opinion 
on hearsay in administrative law yo Perales involved a claim for 
disability benefits after an alleged work injury. At the administrative 
hearing, evidence supporting the claim of disability consisted of live 
testimony by Perales, his physician, and a fellow employee. Con-
versely, the written reports of four examining physicians and the live 
testimony of a doctor who had not examined Perales, but who had 
read the reports of the examining physicians, were presented to refute 
the claim. 
From the evidence, the agency concluded that Perales was not 
disabled. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reversed, ruling that the hearsay of the doctors refuting the claim 
did not constitute substantial evidence because it was contradicted 
by the "only live witnesses." III Prompted by a "number of factors 
... that assure[d] underlying reliability and probative value"112 of 
the evidence, the Supreme Court reversed the fifth circuit decision 
and upheld the agency's decision to deny benefits. Among those 
factors cited by the Court to justify its opinion were: (1) the doctors 
who wrote the report had independently examined Perales; (2) the 
reports were based on accepted medical procedures and tests; (3) no 
doctor was biased or had any interest in the outcome of the hearing; 
(4) there were no inconsistencies among the five reports; (5) Perales 
had not exercised his right under Social Security Administration 
regulations to subpoena the doctors and cross-examine them; (6) the 
social security administrative system is not adversarial, but one in 
which the agency acts as an adjudicator not an advocate; and (7) 
the "pragmatic factor" that to require live testimony would create 
an administrative burden because of the number of cases and the 
expense of live witnesses. 1l3 
109. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
110. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 7.6; Stern, supra note 19, at 105-06; Faines, 
supra note 3, at 360-62. 
111. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 53 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Richardson 
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), noted in Jeka, supra note 3. 
112. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1972). 
113. [d. at 402-06. 
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The Perales court also distinguished an earlier case, Goldberg v. 
Kelly,1I4 in which the Court held that due process required an 
"effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse wit-
ness."IIS The Court noted that, unlike Perales, Kelly involved the 
termination, not the initial grant, of a benefit, and that termination 
cases present issues of credibility and veracity which are not present 
in an initial request for benefits.1I6 
Perales has had a tremendous impact on the law of administrative 
adjudications. Because it was the first Supreme Court case to address 
the issue of hearsay and administrative hearings, and because its 
analysis was so elaborate, it replaced Carroll as the preeminent case. 
on the hearsay issue. Although the legal residuum rule had never 
become as entrenched at the federal level as it had in the states, 117 
Perales marked the death knell for Carroll's legal residuum rule in 
federal agencies. 1I8 Furthermore, many states looked to Perales to 
evaluate their state agency's reliance on hearsay,ll9 At least initially, 
114. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
115. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406-07 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 
(1970». 
116. Id. 
117. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 
576 (1938); Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969), noted in 
Hearsay and the Right oj Conjrontation in Administrative Hearings, 48 N.C. 
L. REv. 608 (1969); Morelli v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 848 (1966); Davis, 
Hearsay, supra note 3, at 695; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 11; 
Faines, supra note 3, at 359. 
118. Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Calhoun v. Bailar, 
626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Cassella v. 
Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985), ajj'd, 519 
A.2d 67 (Conn. 1987); Martin v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters 
Retirement Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 110 (D.C. 1987); Sellnow, supra note 7, at 369; 
Stern, supra note 19, at 116 n.79; Faines, supra note 3, at 360 n.l03. 
119. See Employer's Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819 (Alaska 
1974); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 536 P.2d 197 (Ariz. 1975); Smith V. 
Everett, 637 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. 1982); Kirke V. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 
743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985), ajl'd, 519 A.2d 67 (Conn. 1987); In re Kennedy, 503 
A.2d 1198 (Del. 1985); District of Columbia V. Jones, 442 A.2d 512 (D.C. 
1982); Baehr V. Health & Hosp. Governing Comm'n, 407 N.E.2d 817 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980); McConnell V. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 327 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 
1982); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. V. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 
N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1988); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. McLaurin, 370 So. 2d 1359 
(Miss. 1979); Conners v. Missouri Div. of Family Serv., 576 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1979); Hartford Accident & Indem. CO. V. Duvall, 300 A.2d 732 
(N.H. 1973); Spilotro V. Nevada Gaming Comm'n, 661 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1983); 
Chavez V. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 1375 (N.M. 1982); State Div. 
of Human Rights V. Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd., 423 N.Y.S.2d 748 
(App. Div. 1979); City of Dayton V. Rutledge, 454 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1983); 
Matthew V. Juras, 519 P.2d 402 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Craig V. Pare, 497 A.2d 
316 (R.I. 1985); Brooks V. Klevenhagen, 807 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App. Ct. 1991); 
Longe V. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76 (Vt. 1977). 
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however, Perales did not have a particularly significant impact in 
Maryland, for Maryland had never adopted the Carroll doctrine. 
The first post-Perales case in Maryland involving hearsay and 
administrative hearings was Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of 
Assessments for Washington County.12O Fairchild involved a decision 
of the Maryland Tax Court, a state agency not bound by the rules 
of evidence. 121 In determining the value of a parcel of land, the 
agency considered an appraisal report. Upon review of the tax court's 
decision, the court of appeals noted that the rules of evidence do 
not apply to administrative hearings, and that hearsay, if credible 
and of sufficient probative force, may be the sole basis of the 
decision. 122 Viewing the record as a whole, the court perfunctorily 
concluded that there had been "no violation of the basic rules of 
fairness."123 No attempt was made to discuss the reliability of the 
report in light of either past Maryland decisions or Perales. 
The next case, Rogers v. Radio Shack,l24 dealt with unemploy-
ment compensation benefits in a situation where the claimant was 
discharged for alleged misconduct. The allegations of misconduct 
were presented in an affidavit signed by a "tax accountant" of Radio 
Shack. Rogers testified on his own behalf, denying the allegations. 
The agency found evidence of gross misconduct and denied benefits. 
The claimant then pressed an administrative appeal at which the 
record was reopened and new evidence was presented. Despite a 
newly introduced letter from a Radio Shack vice president contra-
dicting the tax accountant's allegations and concluding that Radio 
Shack would rehire Rogers, the agency nonetheless found evidence 
of ordinary misconduct and disqualified Rogers from receiving ben-
efits for a ten-week period. The administrative decision was then 
affirmed by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 
Several months after the final agency decision, Rogers learned 
that the agency had conducted its own investigation and had included 
the investigation report in the administrative record filed with the 
circuit court. Having never had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
investigator or rebut the report's contents, Rogers motioned to strike 
the report from the record. The circuit court denied the motion to 
strike this report, a decision the court of appeals found to be 
erroneous. The court of appeals recognized that although the rules 
of evidence do not apply at hearings before administrative agencies, 
such agencies must nonetheless observe the "basic rules of fairness 
as to parties appearing before them."12s The court found that "fun-
120. 267 Md. 519, 298 A.2d 148 (1973). 
121. Id. at 521, 298 A.2d at 149. 
122. Id. at 523, 298 A.2d at 150. 
123. Id. at 524, 298 A.2d at 150. 
124. 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113 (1974). 
125. Id. at 129, 314 A.2d at 115. 
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damental fairness would preclude reliance upon the report" because 
there was "no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal." 126 
Convinced by its "examination of the record . . . that neither 
the Board of Appeals nor the circuit court placed any weight upon 
the investigator's report," the court ruled the admission of the 
investigator's report was harmless error that did not require reversal 
of the denial of benefits. 127 The court did, however, reverse the denial 
of benefits because of insufficiency of evidence. 128 The evidence in 
the record consisted of two contradictory statements from Radio 
Shack, a written statement by Rogers, and live testimony by Rogers. 
The tax accountant's affidavit contained no facts describing or de-
lineating the misconduct. 129 Additionally, because the affidavit was 
contradicted by the vice president's letter, the tax accountant's affi-
davit furnished "no evidentiary support"130 for the misconduct find-
ings. 
The Rogers opinion, although lengthier than others, is again 
conclusory and devoid of analysis. It does, however, raise several 
germane issues. First, although not necessary to the decision, the 
court was willing to apply a harmless error approach to the use of 
hearsay. The harmless error approach here, however, was based on 
the court's conclusion that the investigator's report had not been 
relied upon by the agency. In earlier Maryland cases, the court's 
harmless error conclusions had been based on the cumulative nature 
of the hearsay. 131 
Second, the court's conclusion that the investigator's report was 
not relied upon by the agency is inexplicable, for without the report 
the record does not support a finding of misconduct. The more likely 
conclusion is that the agency did rely on the report. This once again 
illustrates a major problem with the harmless error approach - the 
difficulty of evaluating the impact of the hearsay. 
Third, despite earlier cases in Maryland which focused on reli-
ability in deciding whether the hearsay could support an administra-
tive decision, the Rogers court did not analyze the reliability of the 
two letters submitted by Radio Shack. The court assumed that the 
tax accountant's affidavit was unreliable because it was contradicted 
by the vice president's letter. There is no rule, however, that hearsay 
offered later in time is more reliable than previously offered hearsay. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 130, 314 A.2d at 116. 
129. [d. at 131, 314 A.2d at 116. 
130. [d. at 131, 314 A.2d at 117. 
131. See Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); Waddell 
George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 53-54, 161 A. 276, 277-
78 (1932). 
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The Rogers court should have performed a more complete 
reliability analysis. The court should have focused on the nature of 
the investigation by the tax accountant and the vice president, in-
cluding from whom the information was gathered and the responsi-
bilities of both Radio Shack officers. Similarly, cross-examination 
would have been useful on these issues. The court should have 
recognized that the vice president's letter was detrimental to Radio 
Shack's position, and thus was a declaration against interest. Such 
declarations have traditionally been viewed as reliable. 132 The Mary-
land court, however, once again showed little interest in fully ana-
lyzing the matter. 
A few years later, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
decided American Radio-Telephone Service v. Public Service 
Commission 133 which involved the granting of mobile radio operating 
rights to Radio Communications, Inc. (RCI) based on the agency's 
finding that RCI was entitled to be "grandfathered" because of its 
earlier service in the area. Three witnesses testified on behalf of RCI 
at the administrative hearing relating to past service and past cus-
tomers. Affidavits of two RCI customers stating that they had used 
RCI's services in the past were also introduced. One of these affiants 
was on vacation in Florida while the other was never summoned. 
Two witnesses testified at the hearing in opposition to RCI. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland first held that the 
affidavits should not have been admitted. Echoing the court of 
appeals' opinion in Rogers, the court wrote that although adminis-
trative agencies are not bound by the technical common law rules of 
evidence, agencies nonetheless "must observe the basic rules of 
fairness,"134 including the opportunity for reasonable cross-exami-
nation. Because the affiants were not available for cross-examination, 
the court held that admitting the affidavits constituted error. The 
court then concluded, however, that the error was harmless because 
132. The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly allow declarations against interest 
when the declarant is unavailable and "a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). McCormick finds these types of statements reliable 
because "people generally do not lightly make statements that are damaging 
to their interests." 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 316. Maryland has adopted 
the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. See Kammer v. Young, 
73 Md. App. 565, 581, 535 A.2d 936, 944, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 919 (1988) 
(finding statements which are in fact against interest and which a reasonable 
declarant would perceive to be against interest under the circumstances to be 
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule); Agnew v. State, 51 Md. App. 
614,627,446 A.2d 425, 433 (1982) (trustworthiness is indicated when statement 
of declarant is against pecuniary, proprietary or penal interest). 
133. 33 Md. App. 423, 365 A.2d 314 (1976). 
134. [d. at 434, 365 A.2d at 320. 
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. the opponents "made no request for a postponement or for an 
opportunity to bring the affiants in for cross-examination. "135 More-
over, the affidavits were merely cumulative and "infinitesimal" 136 
compared to the whole record. Additionally, the court noted that 
the hearing examiner, when admitting the affidavits, said that they 
"would not be given the same weight as if the people were cross-
examined. "137 
American Radio-Telephone imbues Maryland case law with sev-
eral new developments. First, although not citing Perales, the court 
considered whether the opponents of the hearsay attempted to have 
the out of hearing hearsay declarants testify at the agency hearing. 
The court implied that if the hearsay was so prejudicial, the oppo-
nents would have sought to attack it through cross-examination. 
Second, the court adopted as a general rule that hearsay should not 
be given as much weight as nonhearsay. This is inconsistent with 
earlier Maryland decisions which rejected such a hostile view toward 
hearsayYs Because of the court's reliance on this general hostility 
against hearsay, the court did not evaluate the reliability of· the 
particular hearsay presented at this agency hearing. This is also 
contrary to earlier cases where the court evaluated the reliability of 
the specific hearsay at issue. 139 
Besides ignoring the issue of reliability, the court also ignored 
the issue of the availability of the declarants. When deciding whether 
to permit an agency to rely on hearsay, earlier Maryland decisions 
had been influenced by whether the hearsay declarant was available. 
These cases had indicated a greater willingness to uphold the use of 
hearsay if the declarant was truly unavailable, for example, if the 
hearsay declarant was dead. l40 Here, the declarants were not una-
vailable; it was merely inconvenient for them to testify. This factor 
was not even mentioned by the court. Finally, the court's holding 
that the affidavits were not admissible is narrower than even the 
legal residuum rule, never followed in Maryland, and totally contrary 
to earlier opinions 141 and to the Maryland Administrative Procedure 
135. [d. at 435, 365 A.2d at 320. 
136. [d. at 436, 365 A.2d at 321. 
137. [d. at 435, 365 A.2d at 320. 
138. See Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 
(1932). 
139. See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967). 
140. See, e.g., Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938). 
141. The only opinion that had stated that the hearsay should have been "excluded" 
was Standard Gas Equip. Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927). 
Every other case recognized that the issue is not one of admissibility, but 
rather whether the hearsay was sufficiently reliable to support a finding. 
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Act (APA).142 Therefore, except for its emphasis on the cumulative 
nature of the hearsay, American Radio-Telephone is a poorly crafted 
opinion that ignored relevant issues identified in earlier opinions. 
Reliance on this opinion, therefore, should be avoided. 
The next case, Eichberg v. Maryland Board of Pharmacy,143 
involved an administrative hearing to revoke a pharmacist's license. 
At the hearing, testimony offered at an earlier criminal proceeding 
was admitted. The court of special appeals' opinion in Eichberg is 
confusing. The court first states that "it is well settled in Maryland 
that hearsay evidence is admissible" before administrative agencies, 144 
and that "the test of admissibility under the Maryland AP A is the 
probative value of the evidence, not its credibility. "14S Probative 
value, the court stated, "relates to the degree by which the evidence 
advances the inquiry, whereas credibility relates to the weight to be 
given to the evidence by the trier of fact." 146 The court noted that 
in the case at hand, there was no objection on grounds of probative 
value or relevancy, but only as to the credibility of the evidence. 
This, according to the court, was not grounds for exclusion in this 
case because the testimony from the criminal proceeding had been 
given under oath and had been subject to cross-examination. More-
over, the witness was unavailable "because she was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Board and the State's effort to produce her was 
unsuccessful. "147 
The Eichberg opinion is confusing for several reasons. Despite 
statements in the opinion that "probativity" is the only criterion to 
be used when evaluating an administrative agency's reliance on 
hearsay, the court actually used a reliability analysis. The confusion 
here results from the court's failure to distinguish between reliability 
and credibility. Credibility is in fact a component of reliability. 148 
When reliability is affected by the credibility of a witness who has 
not testified before the agency, a reviewing court must still make the 
reliability determination and consequently consider credibility. 149 
Moreover, in making such a reliability determination, the reviewing 
court is not bound by the agency's determination of credibility. ISO 
142. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §10-208 (1984). 
143. 50 Md. App. 189, 436 A.2d 525 (1981). 
144. [d. at 193, 436 A.2d at 528. 
145. [d. at 193, 436 A.2d at 529. 
146. [d. at 194, 436 A.2d at 529. 
147. [d. 
148. See Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 
N.E.2d 830, 835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
149. [d. 
150. [d. Factors that a reviewing court may consider when looking for indicia of 
reliability include "independence or possible bias of the declarant, the type of 
hearsay materials submitted, whether statements are sworn to, whether state-
ments are contradicted by direct testimony, availability of the declarant, and 
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Contrary to Eichberg, earlier Maryland cases indicate that credibility 
is a relevant concern to a court reviewing the reliability of hearsay. lSI 
Dependence on this aspect of Eichberg should therefore be avoided. 
Eichberg's basic holding, however, is not troublesome. If the 
out-of-hearing declarant is the subject of cross-examination by the 
same party in a criminal case, it is appropriate for the agency in an 
administrative proceeding to rely on that testimony. Because lack of 
opportunity for cross-examination is the major problem with hearsay, 
earlier cross-examination should negate this concern. 152 
It was not until Tron v. Prince George's County l53 that a 
Maryland court relied on the then fifteen year old Perales decision. 
Tron involved a disability claim allegedly arising from a work-related 
injury. The claimant presented live testimony from a doctor who 
testified that the injury was work-related. The county offered no 
witnesses to dispute the claimant's contentions, but introduced a 
booklet containing the written report of three physicians who had 
earlier examined Tron and an opinion from a Dr. Weintraub, who 
had never examined Tron. The reports from the examining physicians 
described Tron's physical condition but did not address the issue of 
whether the condition was work-related. Based upon an examination 
of the three reports, however, Dr. Weintraub's written opinion 
concluded that the disability was not work-related. Tron challenged 
the admission of the booklet on the ground that there was no 
opportunity to cross-examine any of the doctors. 
The Tron court first noted that hearsay generally is admissible 
in administrative hearings, and' 'if credible and of sufficient probative 
credibility of the declarant." Id. (citing Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981». 
151. See, e.g., Fairchild-Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 267 Md. 519, 
523-24, 298 A.2d 148, 150 (1973); Neuman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 251 Md. 
92, 97-98, 246 A.2d 583, 586-87 (1968). 
152. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, former testimony is admissible as a 
hearsay exception if the declarant is unavailable and if the party against whom 
the testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony in a previous proceeding by direct, cross or redirect examination. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Furthermore, prior inconsistent testimony made under 
oath is considered nonhearsay under ,the Federal Rules. Id. at 801 (d)(1)(A). 
Lack of opportunity for cross-examination has been the principal justification 
for the exclusion of hearsay evidence. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 245. 
Maryland has adopted this reasoning. See Lawson v. State, 25 Md. App. 537, 
549, 335 A.2d 135, 141 (1975) (quoting 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1972), for the proposition that "an extrajudicial assertion is excluded 
unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds of the assertion 
and the credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the party against whom 
it is offered"); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989 
& Supp. 1992) (providing parameters for admissibility of out-of-court statements 
of child abuse victims). 
153. 69 Md. App. 256, 517 A.2d 113 (1986). 
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force, may be the sole basis for the decision." IS4 But the court also 
noted that in administrative hearings "a reasonable right of cross-
examination must be allowed." ISS The court then held that "the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is a requirement of adminis-
trative adjudicatory hearings,"IS6 and that "[b]ecause no live wit-
nesses were produced,"ls7 Tron had been denied his right to a fair 
hearing. 
The court of special appeals found this case "remarkably 
similar"ls8 to Perales, but distinguished it based on the availability 
of subpoena power. In Perales, the claimant did not exercise his 
right under the Social Security Act to subpoena the doctor. Con-
versely, in Tron, the claimant had not been provided any subpoena 
power by the Prince George's County Disability Review Board. 159 
The court interpreted Perales to mean that claimants who forgo their 
right to subpoena witnesses cannot later be heard to complain about 
their lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. l60 The Tron 
court determined that Maryland case law is in accord with Perales,161 
so that as long as there is an opportunity to cross-examine, the use 
of hearsay does not violate a claimant's rights. 162 Because Tron had 
no opportunity to cross-examine, the court reversed the agency, 
remanding the case "so that the Board can do a proper job as to 
both the evidence and fact finding."163 
Tron's significance is two-fold. First, the court's reliance upon 
Perales opened the door for use as persuasive authority in Maryland 
applications of Perales from other states .164 Secondly, Tron repre-
sented the first reversal of a Maryland agency decision based upon 
a hearsay opponent's inability to cross-examine the out-of-court 
declarant. Whereas previous agency decisions had been reversed on 
other grounds, never had the court focused on the issue of whether 
the witness could have been subpoenaed. 165 Moreover, earlier Mary-
land cases had upheld agency decisions based on hearsay even when 
154. ld. at 261, 517 A.2d at 116 (quoting Redding v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
263 Md. 94, 110, 282 A.2d 136, 145 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972». 
155. ld. (quoting Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d 
578, 585 (1966». 
156. ld. at 263, 517 A.2d at 117. 
157. ld. 
158. ld. 
159. ld. at 264-65, 517 A.2d at 117-18. 
160. ld. at 264, 517 A.2d at 117. 
16l. ld. at 265, 517 A.2d at 118. 
162. ld. at 266, 517 A.2d at 119. 
163. ld. at 272, 517 A.2d at 122. 
164. See supra note 119. 
165. See, e.g., Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113 (1974). 
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there had been no opportunity for cross-examination, such as when 
the declarant had since died}66 Reading Tron as requiring that there 
must always be an opportunity for cross-examination would limit 
reliance on hearsay more than had earlier cases. Rather, the holding. 
is more appropriately limited to those cases in which there are no 
live witnesses nor an opportunity to subpoena live witnesses. 
It is interesting that Tron relied on the "ability to subpoena" 
aspect of Perales rather than the reliability analysis, which may in 
fact better explain Perales. Whereas Maryland courts had long based 
decisions on a reliability analysis, Maryland's first embrace of Perales 
was, curiously, not on the reliability issue. Had the Tron court 
utilized a reliability analysis, its conclusion may well have been 
different, for under such an analysis, the court may have recognized 
the high reliability of medical reports even absent any live testimony. 
Thus .the hearsay evidence presented may well have been sufficiently 
reliable to support the agency's decision. Tron's emphasis on the 
right of cross-examination, therefore, takes on great significance. 
Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Scruggs l67 
involved admission of polygraph evidence in an administrative hear-
ing. Despite the well settled law in Maryland that polygraph results 
could not be admitted in trial courts,l68 it was argued in Scruggs that 
the relaxed evidentiary standards in administrative hearings dictated 
that polygraph results should be admitted. 169 The court of special 
appeals rejected this argument, finding that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act indicated a clear legislative intent that evidence which is 
incompetent in judicial proceedings should be excluded in proceedings 
before administrative agencies yo After finding that polygraph evi-
dence had "never been held to be competent" in Maryland,17I the 
court held that "unless and until the 'state of the art' of polygraph 
testing improves to the extent that it is considered reliable and 
trustworthy," such evidence must also be inadmissible at agency 
hearings.172 The court further rejected an argument that the admission 
was harmless error, 173 as the polygraph evidence was admitted to 
bolster the credibility of several persons whose credibility was at the 
crux of the case .114 
166. See, e.g., Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938). 
167. 79 Md. App. 312, 556 A.2d 736 (1989). 
168. Rawlings v. State, 7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969). 
169. Scruggs, 79 Md. App. at 321, 556 A.2d at 740. 
170. [d. at 322, 556 A.2d at 741. 
171. [d. at 323, 556 A.2d at 741 (quoting Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 303, 418 
A.2d 217, 220 (1980». 
172. [d. at 313-14, 556 A.2d at 737. 
173. See id. at 324, 556 A.2d at 742. 
174. [d. at 325, 556 A.2d at 742. 
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Strictly speaking, although Scruggs concerns hearsay at an ad-
ministrative hearing, it is better viewed as a "polygraph" case. The 
debate over polygraph evidence in Maryland courtrooms had been 
resolved, and the unreliability of polygraph evidence was not open 
for discussion in Scruggs. Scruggs is significant as an administrative 
law and hearsay case, however, because of its rejection of a harmless 
error approach. 
In Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day 
Nursery,17S a child care center's state license was revoked based on 
testimony at an agency adjudication that a number of preschool-aged 
children had been physically and sexually abused at the center. None 
of the children who had allegedly been abused testified at the 
hearing,176 but parents and social workers were permitted to testify 
as to what the children had told them.177 
Upon initial review of the administrative decision, the circuit 
court ruled that the hearing officer should not have considered any 
of the children's hearsay statements because there had been no 
opportunity to cross-examine them.17s The court of appeals, however, 
reversed the circuit court, upholding the agency's revocation order. 
Citing Perales, the court stated that "due process does not prevent 
an agency from supporting its decision wholly by hearsay if there is 
underlying reliability and probative value. "179 Rather than using the 
tests for reliability developed in earlier Maryland cases or in Perales, 
however, the court utilized a due process balancing test delineated 
by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge. lso 
In Mathews, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
due process required an adversarial hearing before termination of 
social security disability benefits. The Court held that due process 
was satisfied by a post-termination hearing where the recipient could 
argue for reconsideration, and, if successful, would be entitled to 
retroactive payments. lSI Mathews held that "due process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands."ls2 The Supreme Court's flexible due process analysis 
175. 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d 1015 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990). 
176. The day care center licensee had not sought to have the children testify at the 
administrative hearing, but instead requested an opportunity for a psychologist 
chosen by the licensee, to interview the children prior to the open hearing. [d. 
at 580, 565 A.2d at 1018. 
177. Cf, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
(providing parameters for admissibility of out-of-court statements of child 
abuse victims). 
178. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. at 583, 565 A.2d at 1020. 
179. [d. at 595, 565 A.2d at 1026. 
180. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
181. [d. at 335-39, 349. 
182. [d. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972». 
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involved a cost-benefit test balancing three factors: (1) the private 
interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous determination through 
the process accorded and the probable value of added procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the public interest and administrative burdens, 
including costs that the additional procedures would involve. 183 
Relying on Mathews, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in 
Bo Peep that there had been no due process violation because: (1) 
the revocation of a day care center license did not place any liberty 
interest at stake; (2) two hearings had afforded the day care center 
procedural protection; and (3) the decision was based only to a degree 
(not quantified by the court) on hearsay.184 Moreover, the court felt 
that only minimal value would have been gained from "additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards." 18S 
Although the Bo Peep court agreed that due process requires a 
meaningful opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements, 
the court was not persuaded that the circumstances presented amounted 
to a due process violation. The credibility of the hearsay statements, 
according to the court, embraced at least four potential problems: 
(1) whether the child's statement to the parents was false; (2) whether 
the parents intentionally or unintentionally inaccurately conveyed the 
child's testimony at the hearing; (3) whether the adult witness may 
have drawn an erroneous conclusion from the child's accurate de-
scription; and (4) whether the adult witness may have omitted matters 
that the witness deemed insignificant but which would be significant 
to another .186 In response to the possibility that the children were 
lying, the court relied on findings in psychological studies that 
"[y]oung children almost never initiate false allegations without in-
fluence from an adult. "187 In addition, the day care center had cross-
examined, or had the opportunity to cross-examine, adult witnesses 
who testified as to the children's statements. This afforded Bo Peep 
the ability to explore whether the other three potential problems in 
fact existed. 188 Thus, the court declined to find any due process 
violation stemming from a lack of an opportunity to cross-examine 
the children. 189 
Relying on Perales' emphasis on the ability of the adverse party 
to subpoena the hearsay declarant, the state further argued that 
183. [d. at 335. 
184. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 
598, 565 A.2d 1015, 1027 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990). 
185. [d. 
186. [d. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028-29. 
189. [d. The court also recogriized the state's interest in protecting the children 
from further anxiety. [d. at 601, 565 A.2d at 1029. 
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admission of the hearsay was not reversible error because the day 
care center could have subpoenaed the allegedly abused children. 190 
The court refused, however, to "rest [its] decision on this argument" 
because the issue of whether the hearing officer would have been 
correct in quashing requests for subpoenas for the children was not 
before the courL191 
Although Bo Peep is Maryland's most elaborate decision involv-
ing hearsay evidence at administrative hearings, its implications are 
unclear. Bo Peep relies neither on any Maryland cases on point nor 
on Perales. Nor does Bo Peep rely on a reliability analysis, long a 
touchstone in Maryland law on the subject, and which had become 
well accepted in other states and in the federal courts after Perales. 
Because it eschewed a reliability analysis, and because, unlike Mar-
yland cases before and after it, Bo Peep relied almost exclusively on 
Mathews, Bo Peep provides little guidance as to the proper role of 
hearsay in Maryland administrative determinations. 192 
The next administrative hearing case after Bo Peep, Kade v. 
Charles H. Hickey School,193 involved the suspension for alleged 
misconduct of a supervisor at a state operated detention facility. At 
the administrative hearing, the school's superintendent, who was not 
present during the alleged incidents, testified as to statements made 
to him by others concerning Kade's conduct. Also admitted was a 
report by the employee who was the alleged target of the impropriety 
and written statements of students who allegedly' witnessed the inci-
dent. 194 
The Kade court wrote that although hearsay is admissible in an 
administrative proceeding and, if credible and probative, can be the 
sole basis for a decision by an administrative agency, there are, 
190. Id. at 594 n.6, 565 A.2d at 1026 n.6. 
191. Id. 
192. To the extent there is any reliability analysis in Bo Peep, it is subject to 
criticism. The court cited an article in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry to 
support the view that the children's statements were not fabricated. Bo Peep, 
317 Md. at 600, 565 A.2d at 1028 (citing H. Klajnerdiamond, et aI., Assessing 
the Credibility oj Young Children's Allegations oj Sexual Abuse: Clinical 
Issues, 32 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 610, 611 (1987». The court did not recognize 
that there are other studies indicating that the testimony of children in sexual 
abuse cases should not always be believed, and that experts are divided on the 
reliability of such testimony. At a recent conference, there was deep division 
among psychologists over whether child witnesses should be believed in sexual 
abuse cases. Some psychologists believe that children may be influenced by 
adult suggestions of abuse. Liz Hunt, Psychologists Divided on Children 
Testifying, WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at A3; cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing parameters for admis-
sibility of out of court statements of child abuse victims). 
193. 80 Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (1991). 
194. Id. at 724-26, 566 A.2d at 150-51. 
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nonetheless, limits placed on the use of hearsay.195 In this case, the 
court determined that it was improper to base the supervisor's 
suspension solely on hearsay evidence, because "[e]ven though the 
statements were relevant, there was no indication that this hearsay 
evidence was reliable, credible or competent."I96 The court relied on 
the following factors to reach this conclusion: (1) the employee's 
statement was not sworn nor did it reflect the circumstances under 
which it was obtained; (2) the statements from the students were not 
sworn, dated, or verified; and (3) the statements did not indicate the 
students' ages, nor any other information about them to show 
whether they were competent witnesses. l97 
Moreover, the Kade court was concerned that there was no 
explanation in the record as to why the hearsay declarants were 
unavailable to testify in person, nor as to why the school had failed 
to exercise its right to compel their attendance at the hearing. 198 
Although determinations of credibility were crucial, the hearing of-
ficer had "no basis for evaluating the credibility" of the hearsay 
declarants. l99 Finally, the court noted that the hearsay had been 
directly contradicted by live testimony. 200 The court also distinguished 
Eichberg, Mealey and Quasny, because in those cases, there was 
someone who could have been "examined as to when, where and 
how the hearsay statements were made. "201 Furthermore, in those 
cases, unlike in the case at hand, there was some logical or practical 
reason why the declarant was not available to testify at the admin-
istrative hearing.202 The Kade court thus concluded that because the 
agency based its decision on unreliable hearsay, the decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence.203 
Kade marked a return to a reliability analysis. It is generally 
consistent with earlier opinions and presents perhaps the best analysis 
of the hearsay issue by a Maryland court. Kade does, however, 
present one interesting departure from earlier case law in that it 
relied on the fact that the proponent of the hearsay did not subpoena 
the out-of-hearing declarant, whereas both Perales and Tron con-
cerned the ability of the opponent to subpoena the declarant. Placing 
195. [d. at 725, 566 A.2d at 150. 
196. [d. at 726, 566 A.2d at 151. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. at 727, 566 A.2d at 151. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 151. 
202. [d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 151-52. 
203. [d. at 728, 566 A.2d at 152. Because of its reversal on substantial evidence 
grounds, the court found that it was not necessary to address the issue of 
whether Kade's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
had been violated. [d. at 728-29, 566 A.2d at 152. 
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the burden on the proponent to subpoena the declarant may tip the 
balance toward limiting the role of hearsay at agency hearings, 
something which would be quite significant should it be adopted as 
the Maryland rule. Furthermore, Kade's emphasis on the availability 
of the witness to testify at the administrative hearing appears to be 
stronger than expressed in earlier cases. Although the Kade court 
claimed that unreliability of the hearsay was the basis for reversing 
the decision, it seemed at least equally influenced by the lack of 
necessity for the hearsay. 
The most recent Maryland case discussing hearsay at adminis-
trative hearings is Changing Point, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources 
Planning Commission,204 which involved a license application for an 
alcohol and drug abuse treatment facility. In this case, an existing 
substance abuse treatment facility challenged the agency's decision 
to approve a new center. One of the arguments made by the existing 
facility was that the agency decision was improperly based on a 
written trust agreement which constituted hearsay. 20S The court found 
no problem with the trust agreement because it had been available 
to the opponent to examine before the hearing.206 Moreover, the 
person who knew the most about the trust agreement testified as a 
witness and was thus available for cross-examination.207 
The hearsay challenge made in Changing Point was rather weak. 
Two points are worth noting, however. First, the court maintained 
that an opponent of the hearsay should not be able to object if the 
opponent did not subpoena those responsible for the hearsay. This 
is the more traditional attitude, but one contrary to Kade's focus on 
the failure of the hearsay proponent to subpoena out-of-hearing 
declarants. Second, the court was influenced by the prior availability 
of the hearsay, a factor that had not been treated as significant in 
prior Maryland decisions. 
Summary 
In reviewing the cases decided in Maryland from 1971 to the 
present, most notable is the Maryland courts' failure to adopt any 
consistent analytical framework addressing the hearsay issue. Perhaps 
most significant is Maryland's lack of. express reliance on Perales, 
even though Perales has become the basis of most decisions in other 
states. Although some recent Maryland opinions discuss the hearsay 
issue in greater detail than most earlier cases, the lack of a consistent 
approach has led to inconsistent opinions. In reviewing all of the 
204. 87 Md. App. 150, 589 A.2d 502 (1991). 
205. [d. at 169-71, 589 A.2d at 511-12. 
206. [d. at 171, 589 A.2d at 512. 
207. [d. 
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Maryland cases on the subject, litigants can find support for a variety 
of arguments, many of which are entirely contradictory. Moreover, 
the inconsistency of the reported decisions can create confusion not 
only among the litigants, but also within the administrative agencies 
which have not been given sufficiently clear guidance as to the 
parameters that should govern reliance on hearsay. 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
For over sixty-five years, Maryland courts have dealt with the 
issue of hearsay in administrative hearings on an ad hoc basis, 
resulting in inconsistent and generally unsatisfactory opinions. For 
the most part, Maryland courts have not identified considerations 
that would justify different treatment of hearsay from one case to 
another. The hearsay issue should be resolved as part of an analytical 
framework that: (1) provides predictable guidance to administrative 
agencies; (2) takes into account the fact that not all administrative 
adjudications are the same; and (3) recognizes that hearsay which is 
sufficiently reliable in one adjudication may not be sufficiently reli-
able in another. 208 The next section focuses on developing such a 
framework. 
Nature of the Claim or Issue 
In developing a framework to determine when hearsay is suffi-
cient by itself to support an agency decision, the nature of the claim 
or issue pending before the agency should be considered. 209 It has 
been suggested, for example, that proceedings such as revocations of 
professional licenses warrant greater scrutiny of, and less willingness 
to rely on, hearsay than proceedings such as initial claims for 
disability, workers' compensation, or unemployment benefits.210 
208. See Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P .2d 16,22 (Colo. 1987) (differing 
hearsay standards are appropriate based on the particular type of proceeding); 
see also Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 698; Davis, Problems oj Evidence, 
supra note 3, at 423; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 16. 
209. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Unemployment Compen-
sation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981); Davis, Problems oj Evidence, 
supra note 3, at 387, 393; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21; John M. Hutchins, 
Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule in Colorado, 17 COLO. LAW. 651, 
652 (1988); Odes L. Stroupe, Jr., Note, Hearsay Need Not Be Supported by. 
Competent Guidance in Exclusionary Proceedings Pursuant to the Casino 
Control Act, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 214, 216 (1988). 
210. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 387 (positing that taking 
away a license equivalent to livelihood should not be done without opportunity 
for cross-examination); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21 (positing that an agency 
may rely on evidence to deny the grant of a license that would be inadequate 
to revoke the same license). 
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Such a disparate treatment of hearsay is warranted for several 
reasons. First, the number of license revocation cases is small relative 
to the number of cases in which persons are seeking benefits. There-
fore, the cumulative burden on an agency to develop a factual record 
not solely dependent on hearsay is not as great in license revocation 
cases. Although hearsay may be a "necessary evil" in such an 
immense setup as the social security disability system,2I1 those agencies 
that do not have such a large adjudicatory caseload need not rely 
on the hearsay "shortcut." 
Second, someone faced with a license revocation is far more 
likely to be represented by counsel at the agency hearing than 
someone merely seeking a benefit. 212 An attorney's involvement will 
tend to formalize the process regardless of whether or not hearsay 
is admitted. Thus one of the major justifications for acceptance of 
hearsay - the informality of administrative proceedings - becomes 
much less relevant. Moreover, a party's right of cross-examination 
becomes much more meaningful when counsel is present. Reliance 
on hearsay defeats this right and inappropriately limits the role of 
the lawyer. 
A third justification for focusing on the nature of the pending 
claim or issue is simply that certain matters are more important than 
others. For matters of greater import, reliance on hearsay ought to 
be discouraged. 213 One problem inherent in such an approach is 
distinguishing the "more important" from the "less important" case. 
For example, while a routine unemployment compensation case might 
ordinarily be viewed as less important than a professional license 
revocation case, to the unemployed person seeking benefits there is 
211. See Perales, 402 u.s. at 406; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 699; Harry 
Kalven, Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 329 
(1971). 
212. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 365, 396-97; Stephen D. 
Natcher, Note, Hearsay Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS 
L.J. 369, 371 (1964) (comparing representation by counsel in civil trials to 
representation at administrative hearings). 
213. See, e.g., Lim v. Taxicab Comm'n, 564 A.2d 720, 724-25 (D.C. 1989); Chavez 
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 1375, 1380 (N.M. 1982) (Easley, C.J., 
dissenting); Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 610 P .2d 747, 748 (N .M. 
1980); Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 462 P.2d 139, 143 (N.M. 1969); Davis, 
Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 7; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 21; Jeka, supra 
note 3, at 161; see also Perales, 402 U.S. 389; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970); Ceja, 427 A.2d 631; Davis, Hearsay, supra note 3, at 699; cf 
Bernard Schwartz, A Decade oj Administrative Law: 1942 - 1951, 51 MICH. 
L. REv. 775, 817 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945), 
for the position that the seriousness of the penalty of deportation mandates 
that "meticulous care" be taken to achieve "essential standards of fairness" 
in deportation hearings). 
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no more important case.214 Nevertheless, when evaluating the relia-
bility of hearsay in order to determine whether it is sufficient to 
support an agency decision, consideration of the nature of the claim 
or issue involved is a reasonable criterion. 
Nature oj the Evidence 
In addition to focusing on the nature of the issue involved, the 
agency should give consideration to the nature of the hearsay evidence 
sought to be introduced. First, agencies should consider whether the 
substantive nature of the evidence is more easily understood if 
presented in written form or if presented orally.21S For example, it 
has been suggested that complicated medical testimony is more easily 
digested by an agency when presented in written form.216 In such 
cases, a liberal attitude toward hearsay may be justified in order to 
save the agency's time and to increase the agency's understanding of 
the evidence. On the other hand, as discussed later, consideration 
should also be given to whether the author of the report should be 
available for cross-examination even if the presentation of the case 
is adequate via the written report. 217 This would be true, for example, 
if the report were so complicated that without the author's in-person 
explanation, the agency would not be able to comprehend it. 
Other considerations involving the nature of the evidence include 
whether the hearsay evidence is conclusory218 or ambiguous,219 for 
such evidence is unlikely to be sufficient to support an agency finding. 
Additionally, courts have been especially reluctant to find double 
hearsay sufficiently reliable to support an administrative decision.220 
Other factors useful in analyzing the reliability of hearsay at admin-
istrative hearings include: (1) whether the hearsay was sworn under 
oath;221 (2) whether the hearsay statements were made close in time 
214. See Ceja, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("to the claimant the 
administrative hearing is not 'routine"'). 
215. See Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 
671, 678-79 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., concurring). 
216. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 821-
22 (Alaska 1974). 
217. See infra notes 240-247 discussing usefulness of cross-examination. 
218. See Martin v. Police & Firefighters Retirement Relief Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 111 
(D.C. 1987). 
219. See Collins v. D'Elia, 480 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 (App. Div. 1984). 
220. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
221. See Kade v. Hickey, 80 Md. App. 721, 726, 566 A.2d 148, 151 (1989); Embers 
of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 
835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting); Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. 
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 641 (Pa. 1981). 
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to the incident at issue;222 and (3) whether the hearsay has been 
corroborated.223 For example, uncorroborated hearsay is rarely viewed 
to be reliable. 224 Uncorroborated hearsay that has been contradicted 
is even more unlikely to be held to be reliable. 225 All these factors 
which relate to the nature of the evidence are appropriate to consider 
in analyzing the reliability of hearsay and in determining whether the 
hearsay is sufficient to support an administrative decision. 
Identity of the Out of Hearing Declarant 
In addition to the nature of the issue and the nature of the 
evidence, the identity of the hearsay declarant should be a relevant 
consideration in evaluating the reliability of the hearsay. As a general 
rule, hearsay evidence from unidentified persons should never be 
222. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 639 
(deeming medical reports reliable because they were written immediately after 
examination); Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652; Jeka, supra note 3, at 160. 
223. See Hentges v. Bartsch, 533 P.2d 66, 69 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Jadallah v. 
District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 678 (D.C. 
1984) (Ferren, J., concurring); McConnell v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 327 
N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1982) (finding hearsay evidence that "merely supple-
ments" other evidence admissible); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; Davis, Residuum 
Rule, supra note 3, at 6; Stern, supra note 19, at 115. 
Hearsay has been allowed to be corroborated by other hearsay. See Peters 
v. United States, 408 F.2d 719, 722-24 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see id. at 738 
(Skelten, J., dissenting) ("Adding hearsay to hearsay is like adding zero to 
zero which still equals zero."). Also relevant is whether the corroboration of 
the hearsay is by the opponent of the hearsay. Corroboration by an opponent 
will lend strong support to the reliability of the hearsay. See Altholtz v. 
Connecticut Dental Comm'n, 493 A.2d 917, 921 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); 
Embers oj Salisbury, 517 N.E.2d at 833. 
224. See Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938) ("mere uncor-
roborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence"); Silver 
v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 129 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416 (Ct. 
App. 1976) (uncorroborated hearsay that is contradicted is not sufficient by 
itself to support a finding); Wallace v. District of Columbia Unemployment 
Compensation Bd., 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. 1972) (substantial evidence includes 
more than uncorroborated hearsay); Stroupe, supra note 209, at 610 n.14 
(collecting cases citing the substantial evidence test in Consolidated Edison). 
225. See Jacabowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555, 562-63 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Kowal 
v. United States, 412 F.2d 867, 871-73 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Embers oj Salisbury, 
517 N.E.2d at 835 (Lynch, J., dissenting); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; cf. Cassella 
v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (corroborated 
hearsay has a high degree of probative value); In re Thompson, 583 A.2d 
1006, 1007 (D.C. 1990) (uncorroborated hearsay is reliable if declarant also 
testified at hearing and could have been cross-examined about out-of-hearing 
statements). 
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acceptable as the basis of an administrative decision. 226 Hearsay from 
an out-of-hearing declarant who might be biased should not enjoy a 
presumption of reliability and should be viewed with strong suspicion 
and carefully evaluated.227 For example, in unemployment compen-
sation cases involving allegations of employee misconduct, the hearsay 
statements of those customers who have alleged the misconduct 
should be carefully scrutinized because the customers cannot be 
viewed as neutral.228 Hearsay evidence of misconduct offered from 
the employer should be scrutinized even more intensely because of 
the interested nature of their testimony.229 
Conversely, courts have found certain classes of hearsay declar-
ants to be especially reliable. For example, courts have held physi-
cian's reports to be highly reliable because of the medical profession's 
high standards of expertise.230 Reports from both examining physi-
cians,231 and physicians who assess the records of examining 
226. Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652 (citing Griffin v. Evans Electrical Constr. 
Co., 529 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App. 1975»; see also, Kade v. Hickey Sch., 80 
Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (1989). 
227. See Jadallah v. District of Columbia Dep't of EmploYment, 476 A.2d 671, 679 
(D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J., concurring) (stating that an agency should consider 
bias and interest of the witness, consistency of statement with other evidence, 
and opportunity for opposing counsel to investigate the statement); Cassella v. 
Civil Service Comm'n, 494 A.2d 909, 912 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Peters v. 
United States, 408 F.2d 719, 724 (Cl. Ct. 1969) (affidavit signed in return for 
government's promise of immunity); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 832 (Mass. 1988) (minor's hearsay 
testimony that she had been sold alcohol was attacked as unreliable because 
of bias based on her attempt to prove intoxication as a defense to a serious 
criminal charge); Longe v. Department of Employment Sec., 380 A.2d 76 (Vt. 
1977); Bonney v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 519 P.2d 383, 388 (Or. Ct. App. 
1974) (reports written by inmate's accusers are less detached). 
228. See Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (Cooper, 
J., dissenting). 
229. Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 644 (Pa. 1981); 
Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546 A.2d 1365, 1368 (Vt. 
1988); see also Drogaris v. Martine's Inc., 118 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1960) (hearsay from fellow employees should also be viewed suspiciously 
because of their reluctance to testify against employer's interest). 
230. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Carlson v. Kozlowski, 374 A.2d 
207, 208 (Conn. 1977) (citing Perales); Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of 
Human Resources, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (N.C. 1982); Martin v. District of 
Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement Bd., 532 A.2d 102, 110 (D.C. 1987) 
(citing Perales); see also, Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652 (citing Perales and 
Ceja); Kalven, supra note 211, at 330-31 (construing Perales and Kelly v. 
Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970». 
231. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402; Martin, 532 A.2d at III (applying Perales). Cf. 
Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 (1976) 
(testimony of a nontreating physician is inadmissible). 
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physicians232 are deemed reliable. Courts have also generally found 
reliable written reports of "licensed medical professionals" so long 
as the hearsay involves matters within their expertise and is unbi-
ased.233 Similarly deemed reliable are police reports made in connec-
tion with an officer's law enforcement duties,234 as well as official 
reports made by other public employees.23S 
Courts have found dealing with the hearsay statements of chil-
dren especially troublesome, particularly where sexual abuse is al-
leged. Psychologists are divided on whether children testify accurately 
about such events.236 Because of this conflict, in cases where a minor 
is the hearsay declarant, various factors relating to reliability should 
be closely evaluated. For example, the testimony of social workers 
concerning a child's hearsay statements is generally more reliable 
than testimony from the child's parents, who cannot be viewed as 
disinterested. 237 Other relevant factors in determining the reliability 
of a child's testimony include whether the child's story was ambiguous 
or subject to misinterpretation,238 and whether the child's statements 
were made as part of a narrative or in response to leading questions. 239 
A vailability of Nonhearsay and Usefulness of Cross-Examination 
Other relevant areas of inquiry are the availability of nonhearsay 
and whether cross-examination of the hearsay declarant would be 
useful.240 Nonhearsay should generally be preferred, and, if available, 
232. Perales, 402 U.S. at 404; Ceja, 427 A.2d at 639. But see Georgia Pac. Corp. 
v. McLaurin, 370 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Miss. 1979) (doctors are merely human 
and may not be considered wholly free from the frailties that beset the rest of 
us). 
233. Schaffer v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 759 P.2d 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1988) (nurses); Altholtz v. Connecticut Dental Comm'n, 493 A.2d 917, 921 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (dentists); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641 (listing factors affecting 
reliability); see also Hutchins, supra note 209, at 652. 
234. See Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16 (Colo. 1987). 
235. See In re Kevin G., 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (1975) (pam. Ct. 1975) (relying 
on presumption of "official regularity" and on fact that report was "routine" 
and "impersonal" in concluding that a laboratory report by a police chemist 
was reliable); Webster ex rei Lisa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 
499 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (medical examiner's report); 
Craig v. Pare, 497 A.2d 316, 320 (R.1. 1985) (accident reports prepared by 
Division of Motor Vehicles); see also, Steven P. Grossman & Stephen P. 
Shapiro, The Admission'of Government Fact Findings Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(8)(C): Limiting the Dangers of Unreliable Hearsay, 38 KAN. L. 
REv. 767 (1990). 
236. See Hunt, supra note 192, at A3. 
237. A.Y. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 583 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990) (quoting L.W.B. v. Sosnowski, 343 A.2d 1241, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1988». 
238. Id. at 520; B.G. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 583 A.2d 672, 674 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1990). 
239. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1990). 
240. See Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
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there should be less willingness to permit an agency to rely on 
hearsay.241 When forced to rely on hearsay, it is more acceptable 
that the hearsay be from a declarant who is truly not available, such 
as a d~cedent, rather than from a declarant who is absent without 
excuse or merely because Of inconvenience.242 Nonetheless, the con-
cept of unavailability must embrace the practical expense of produc-
ing a live witness. 243 For example, the expense of producing a doctor 
to testify might be so burdensome as to justify an agency's reliance 
on hearsay testimony from the doctor. 244 
The value of cross-examination of the particular hearsay declar-
ant has also been cited as a relevant factor in evaluating an agency's 
reliance on hearsay. 24S If it can be concluded that cross-examination 
would not have benefitted the hearsay opponent, then there would 
seem to be little problem with the agency's reliance on hearsay. Such 
was the situation in a New York case where the court relied on the 
written report of a police laboratory chemist out of a belief that it 
would have been impossible for the chemist to recall the particular 
tests he performed when writing the report. 246 Although this approach 
may sometimes be useful, it must be exercised with caution. Pre-
dicting the utility of cross-examination in any given case may be 
difficult because cross-examination often brings out unexpected mat-
ters.247 In order to avoid unjust reliance on the presumption that 
cross-examination would not be beneficial, the hearsay proponent 
u.s. 906 (1981); Cassella v. Civil Servo Comm'n of New Britain, 494 A.2d 
909, 913 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (relying on 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.7-8 (1980»; Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. 
Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (pa. 1981) (citing DAVIS, supra, § 14.10 (1958 & Supp. 
1970»; Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546 A.2d 1365 
(Vt. 1988); Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5. 
241. See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 2; Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 5; 
Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 376; Unemployment Compen-
sation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d at 641; Longe v. Department of Employment 
Sec., 380 A.2d 76, 79 (Vt. 1977). 
242. See Longe, 380 A.2d at 79. Compare Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 
116, 148 A. 246 (1930) (declarant deceased) with Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 
Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113 (1974) (declarant available but not called). 
243. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 822 
(Alaska 1974) (cost of medical experts); Kalven, supra note 211, at 329 
(administrative efficiency). 
244. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971). 
245. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 11. 
246. In re Kevin G., 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (Fam. Ct. 1975). 
247. See Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 
225 A.2d 294 (1966). The court wrote that it would be a mockery of justice 
to hold that a person cannot complain of the denial of the right to cross-
examine unless it can be shown what the result of the cross-examination would 
have been because that result is "often as unexpected as it is revealing." Id. 
at 66, 225 A.2d at 303. 
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ought to bear the burden of proving that cross-examination would 
not benefit the hearsay opponent. 
Another consideration related to availability and usefulness of 
hearsay is whether the proponent exercised a right to subpoena the 
out-of-hearing declarant.248 Hearsay opponents who have a right to 
subpoena and who believe that cross-examination would be helpful 
ought to exercise their subpoena rights; failure to do so should 
effectively waive any claim of prejudice in not being able to cross-
examine. Conversely, it would be improper for an agency that lacks 
procedures that allow an opponent to subpoena a hearsay declarant 
to rest a decision on hearsay. 249 
A few qualifications to this view seem appropriate. First, even 
when subpoena procedures are available, some have expressed con-
cern about the propriety of requiring the hearsay opponents to 
subpoena as a witness someone whose hearsay is damaging to them.250 
One Pennsylvania judge wrote that it is "contrary to our jurispru-
dence to require an individual to call adverse witnesses against 
himself. "251 It has also been noted that to require the opponent to 
subpoena the unfavorable witness unfairly shifts the burden of proof 
to the opponent. 252 This is especially troublesome in matters where 
the state has the burden yet attempts to prove its case solely through 
hearsay. 
Another concern expressed with the subpoena rule involves the 
expense of producing the hearsay declarant. The Supreme Court of 
Alaska has held that there is no waiver if the hearsay opponent is 
required to bear the cost of producing the witness at the hearing.253 
The court suggested that the agency be required to pay the cost or 
248. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 404-05; Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 
427 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981); Kirke v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 743 P.2d 16 
(Colo. 1987); Langlois v. Department of Employment Training, 546 A.2d 1365, 
1369-70 (Vt. 1988); Webster ex rei Lisa v. Workman's Compensation Appeal 
Bd., 499 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Dowd v. District of 
Columbia Police & Firefighters' Retirement Bd., 485 A.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C. 
1984). 
249. See Souch v. Califano, 599 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1979); Sisler v. Califano, 484 
F. Supp. 326 (N.D.W.V. 1979); Smith v. Everett, 637 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ark. 
1982); Tron v. Prince George's County, 69 Md. App. 256, 517 A.2d 113 
(1986); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 646 (Roberts, J., 'concurring); see also Stern, supra 
note 19, at 118. 
250. See Jeka, supra note 3, at 155, 159, 164; Stroupe, supra note 209, at 612-16. 
251. Ceja, 427 A.2d at 647 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Dragan v. Connecticut 
Medical Examining Bd., 591 A.2d 150, 154 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991), a/I'd 613 
A.2d 739 (Conn. 1992). 
252. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 536 P.2d 197, 201-02 (Ariz. 1975); 
Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 
830, 835 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting); Ceja, 427 A.2d at 647 (Roberts, 
J., concurring); Collins, supra note 66, at 600. 
253. Commercial Union Co. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261, 1266-67 (Alaska 1976). 
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that the cost be taxed to the losing party. 254 It has also been suggested 
that once a party has raised a "credible reason to question the 
reliability of the hearsay," the agency itself should issue the subpoena 
so that the declarant can personally testify.m 
Nature oj the Agency and Its Adjudicatory Hearings 
Differences between agencies may lead to disparate treatment of 
hearsay by these agencies. For example, differences in the required 
qualifications of both those who preside at the hearings and of those 
who may make the decision might be taken into account. 256 It has 
been suggested that nonlawyer hearing officers will be less able to 
ignore questionable hearsay than hearing officers who are lawyers. 257 
Lawyers are accustomed to dealing with the rules of evidence and 
admissibility at jury trials, and thus are able to ignore evidence even 
after it has been presented, while nonlawyers may not be able to 
disregard such evidence.258 This reasoning leads to the conclusion that 
there should be more reluctance to permit a decision to be based on 
hearsay if a nonlawyer, as opposed to a lawyer, presided. Conversely, 
nonlawyer hearing officers will most likely be employed in informal 
proceedings where the parties are unlikely to be represented by 
counsel, in which case a stricter rule concerning hearsay and nonlaw-
yer presiding officers would be counterproductive. 
The distinction between lawyer and nonlawyer presiding officers 
may be even more significant where the issue is whether unreliable 
hearsay was used to buttress other evidence in the record or to 
support the credibility of a witness, the so called "harmless error" 
approach.259 If it is accepted that nonlawyers are less able to disregard 
unreliable evidence, then reliance on a harmless error argument 
should be closely scrutinized if a nonlawyer official is involved.260 
Another consideration focuses on the workload of the hearing officer. 
It can be argued that hearing officers who hear a wide variety of 
254. /d. 
255. Ceja, 427 A.2d at 642. 
256. Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 396-97. 
257. Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67. In Maryland, the Chief Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) must be a member of the Maryland Bar. MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
Gov'T § 9-1603(c)(2) (Supp. 1992). The Chief ALJ is charged with establishing 
ALJ qualifications. Id. § 9-1604(a)(2). Qualification standards currently in 
force require that any ALJ appointed after February 1, 1990, be a member in 
good standing of a bar in any jurisdiction. Qualification Standards Adminis-
trative Law Judge, 1990 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ANN. REp., app. 
5. 
258. Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67. 
259. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
260. Sellnow, supra note 7, at 366-67. 
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cases involving diverse fact patterns might have greater difficulty 
evaluating the reliability of hearsay than hearing officers who rou-
tinely hear cases with common factual and legal issues.261 Hearing 
officers presiding over cases from a number of dissimilar agencies 
should be especially cautious in their hearSay analysis. 
Another issue to consider is whether the agency's hearings are 
adversarial. Agencies whose hearings are adversarial should not be 
permitted to rest their decisions on hearsay to the same degree as 
agencies whose hearings are less adversarial and more informal.262 A 
related inquiry is whether the parties usually are represented by 
counse1.263 If lawyers typically represent parties at an agency's hear-
ing, then reliance on hearsay may be less justified than if lawyers 
are not typically present, for the mere participation by a lawyer will 
tend to formalize the process, regardless of the issue at hand. 
Moreover, the right of cross-examination is more meaningful when 
exercised by a lawyer. It can also be argued that because lawyers 
understand and appreciate the value of cross-examination, the use of 
hearsay may be a tactical decision by a lawyer to deny the opponent 
an opportunity to discredit the evidence. In such a situation, the 
agency should be especially careful in permitting hearsay to be the 
sole basis of its decision. 
The amount of precision required in making the agency decision 
is yet another factor to consider. Some agency decisions require 
precise factual findings, while others require only general conclusions, 
perhaps of a more legislative quality. The scrutiny given the reliability 
of the hearsay should rise commensurately with the precision required 
for resolution of the factual issues. 264 A further inquiry is whether 
the adjudication relates to particular facts involving a particular party 
261. See Stern, supra note 19, at 103-04 (quoting 1 S. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 36 (3d 
ed. 1940». At the Maryland OAH, the Chief Administrative Law Judge has 
the power to assign administrative law judges. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T 
§ 9-1604(a)(4) (Supp. 1992). A system of regional dockets has been implemented 
in order to increase efficiency and convenience. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS, 1990 ANN. REp. 1. In conjunction with this, a quality assurance 
program was developed. After an ALJ is cross-trained in new areas, his or her 
draft decisions are reviewed by experienced Subject Matter Specialists (SMS). 
Once competence is demonstrated in that subject area, the ALJ is certified by 
the Chief Administrative Law Judge as qualified to hear that type of case 
without SMS supervision. Id. at 2-3. 
262. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971); Davis, Problems oj 
Evidence, supra note 3, at 379; Jeka, supra note 3, at 161. 
263. See Davis, Problems oj Evidence, supra note 3, at 365, 396-97. 
264. See Davis, Residuum Rule, supra note 3, at 9-11; Davis, Problems oj Evidence, 
supra note 3, at 388-90. 
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or whether it relates to a broader policy issue.26s More leeway should 
be permitted with hearsay in hearings which are aimed at developing 
policy rather than adjudicating particular private rights. 
The standard of proof at the agency hearing might also be 
relevant in evaluating the reliability of hearsay and its ability to 
support a finding. Less flexibility should be permitted in relying on 
hearsay if the standard necessitates a finding supported by clear and 
convincing evidence as opposed to a finding that must be supported 
only by a preponderance of the evidence.266 This would typically also 
relate to the importance of the issue being litigated.267 
The standard of judicial review might also be relevant. If the 
standard of review on appeal is de novo, it seems appropriate to 
accept hearsay at the administrative leveJ.268 The most liberal ap-
proach to hearsay would be to create as full a record as possible. 
This could facilitate settlements and totally bypass the need for 
judicial review. Moreover, because a trial de novo is available, there 
can be little claim of prejudice from the hearsay. 
Procedural Safeguards 
As well as the aforementioned substantive factors which should 
be used to evaluate the proper role of hearsay, agencies should also 
consider implementing procedures to alleviate some of the problems 
that arise from reliance on hearsay. For example, it has been sug-
gested that if a party intends to rely on hearsay, the hearsay should 
be provided to the opponent prior to the hearing,269 thus enabling 
the opponent to contact the declarant to discuss the hearsay, or 
265. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 3, at 424. 
266. Hutchins, supra note 209, at 363. 
267. See discussion supra notes 209-214. The higher standard of proof should be 
viewed as indicative of an increased sense of importance of that issue. 
268. See Sellnow, supra note 7, at 363. 
269. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); ladallah v. District of 
Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 476 A.2d 671, 679 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, 
1., concurring) (citing 10hnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 191 (D.C. Cir. 
1980»; Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (Cooper, 
1., dissenting); Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 591 A.2d 150, 
154 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages 
Control Comm'n, 517 N.E.2d 830, 832-33 (Mass. 1988); Kalven, supra note 
211, at 331. 
Maryland provides for testimony to be received in written form in the 
discretion of the administrative law judge; if allowed, such testimony must be 
filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings and served on opposing parties 
no later than 10 days before the hearing. OAH Rules of Procedure, COMAR 
28.02.01. 18(E). As this provision is permissive, not mandatory, the practical 
significance of this section is as yet unclear. 
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alternatively, to file with the agency a notice of intent to cross-
examine.270 It would then be the duty of the agency to issue a 
subpoena for the declarant or rule that a subpoena was not neces-
sary.271 The burden of showing that a subpoena should not be issued 
should be on the proponent of the hearsay. 
It has also been suggested that if a system of prior notice is not 
established, agencies should liberally grant continuances if, after the 
hearsay has been presented, the opponent requests an opportunity 
for cross-examination.272 Another suggested alternative is that if the 
agency's decision does rely on hearsay, the losing party would have 
a right to request the reopening of the record for the purpose of 
subpoenaing and cross-examining the adverse hearsay witnesses.273 At 
this point, the burden should be on the opponent of the hearsay to 
justify the need for cross-examination. 
Summary 
Because Maryland case law has proceeded on an ad hoc basis, 
parties and agency personnel are without a consistent, predictable 
framework upon which to rely when dealing with the proper role of 
hearsay in administrative adjudications. This section of the article 
has defined those factors which could form the basis of a framework 
of analysis on the hearsay issue. These factors are: (1) the issue 
involved; (2) the nature of the evidence presented; (3) the identity of 
the out of hearing declarant; (4) the availability of the out of hearing 
declarant and the usefulness of cross-examination; and (5) the nature 
of the agency and its adjudicatory hearings. Procedural rules have 
also been offered which could help avoid. potential unfairness that 
may result from an agency's reliance on hearsay. The next section 
will discuss how these proposals can be implemented in Maryland. 
270. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819, 823 
(Alaska 1974). 
271. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981). 
Various rules of the Maryland OAH relate to subpoenas. The notice of hearing 
must contain a statement "of the right to request subpoenas for witnesses and 
evidence." COMAR 28.02.01.05(B)(3). The ALJ has power to "£i]ssue sub-
poenas for witnesses and the production of evidence: COMAR 28.02.01.08(B)(2). 
Other rules guide the request of, issuance of, service of, objection to, and 
enforcement of subpoenas. COMAR 28.02.01.11. 
272. See Silver v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 129 Cal. Rptr. 411, 
415 (Ct. App. 1976); Dowd v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' 
Retirement Bd., 485 A.2d 212, 215-16 (D.C. 1984); State Div. of Human 
Rights v. Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 
(App. Div. 1979); Langlois v. Department of Employment & Training, 546 
A.2d 1365, 1369 (Vt. 1988); see also OAH Rules oj Procedure, CO MAR 
28.02.01.08(B)(7) (granting ALJ power to grant continuances); COMAR 
28.02.01.08(B)(2) (granting ALJ power to issue subpoenas). 
273. See Farmer v. Everett, 648 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); see also 
Reynolds v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 94 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 
1950). 
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IMPLEMENTATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
There is a practical reason why a consistent and predictable 
approach to the proper role of hearsay at administrative hearings is 
desirable. When preparing for an administrative hearing, an attorney 
or an unrepresented litigant must decide whether to ask a supporting 
witness to make a personal appearance, possibly requiring the witness 
to take time off from work or to incur child care or travel expenses, 
or whether the witness' sworn testimony in the form of an affidavit 
would be sufficient. Because Maryland cases lack sufficient guidance 
on the proper role of hearsay at administrative hearings, the only 
safe posture at present would be to request the witness to testify in 
person. Yet this is antithetical to the administrative process' function 
of providing an informal process and its willingness to rely on 
hearsay. Refinement of the treatment of hearsay is therefore impor-
tant not only to guide the litigants, but also to maintain the integrity 
of the administrative process. 
Such refinement is best provided not at the judicial level, but at 
the administrative level. As discussed in the previous section, differ-
ences inherent in administrative adjUdications may lead to different 
conclusions about the role of hearsay in those adjudications. What 
may be reliable to support one agency adjudication may not be 
sufficiently reliable to support another. That this point has generally 
not been recognized in court decisions is not surprising, given that 
courts have no special understanding or insight into the adjudications 
each agency conducts. Such understanding and insight does, however, 
exist at the administrative level. Therefore, it is suggested that ad-
ministrative guidelines be adopted in order to achieve some predict-
ability on the hearsay issue.274 
In Maryland, this process would need to be done at various 
levels because of the advent of the Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH). Prior to 1990, most administrative cases in Maryland were 
adjudicated by hearing examiners employed by the individual agen-
cies. In 1990, however, the OAH was created as a central hearings 
agency,275 and was given the power to adjudicate cases from many, 276 
274. See Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976). The 
court "strongly recommended" to the Workmen's Compensation Board that 
they adopt procedures to fill the "procedural void relating to medical reports 
and the right to cross-examination." Id. at 1267. 
275. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1602 (Supp. 1992). 
276. OAH hears cases on behalf of about twenty state agencies administering over 
two hundred different programs. The vast majority of hearings before OAH 
are from the Motor Vehicle Administration. Other agencies whose cases are 
heard by OAH include Department of Mental Health and Hygiene, Department 
of Human Resources, Department of Licensing and Regulation, Department 
of Personnel, Department of the Environment, Department of Natural Re-
sources, Human Relations Commission, Tax Court, Department of Education, 
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but not all,277 administrative agencies. Those agencies that do not 
come under OAH jurisdiction should independently promulgate their 
own guidelines for hearsay. These guidelines should be based on the 
factors discussed earlier in this Article. 278 For those agencies that do 
come under OAH jurisdiction, the process will be a bit more com-
plicated. Because OAH hears cases from different agencies, it will 
need to work with each agency to develop hearsay guidelines for that 
particular agency's adjudications.279 In going through this process, 
Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems, Board of Public Works, 
Higher Education Commission, Office of the Attorney General, Secretary of 
State, and Department of Agriculture. See OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
INFORMATIONAL BROCHURE; OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, 1990 ANN. 
REp., app. 1. 
277. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1601 (Supp. 1992) excludes the Governor, 
. the Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Inmate Grievance, Public Service, 
Workmen's Compensation, Parole, Health Services Cost Review, and Health 
Resources Planning Commissions from OAH jurisdiction. Furthermore, local 
and county agencies do not come under OAH jurisdiction. 
278. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to draft hearsay regulations for 
every agency, application of some of the factors discussed earlier in the article 
to some of the Maryland agencies not under OAH jurisdiction is possible. For 
example, the fact that judicial review of Workmen's Compensation Commission 
cases is de novo, see General Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 555 
A.2d 542 (1989), should be most significant in the Commission's adoption of 
hearsay regulations. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. Decisions of 
the Public Service Commission and the Health Services Cost Review Commis-
sion would most likely involve decisions involving factual precision. See supra 
note 264 and accompanying text. Decisions of the Health Resources Planning 
Commission, on the other hand, tend to be based on future facts and the 
broader policy issue of whether a certificate of need for a new hospital should 
be issued. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. Public Service Commis-
sion decisions are sometimes based on technical reports without the author 
being available for reports. This type of hearsay should be treated differently 
than hearsay statements made to a utility investigator by a neighbor of a 
customer who is being investigated for fraud. See supra notes 223-235 and 
accompanying text. It should also be noted that Maryland agencies already 
have the statutory authority to adopt the type of hearsay regulations proposed 
in this article. In fact, MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-204(a) (1984), 
requires each agency to adopt regulations to govern procedures for contested 
cases. 
279. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to draft hearsay regulations for 
every agency, application of some of the factors discussed earlier in the Article 
to some of the Maryland agencies under OAH jurisdiction is possible. For 
example, development of hearsay regulations for the Motor Vehicle Adminis-
tration should take into consideration the vast number of MV A cases heard 
each year (over 37,000 in 1990). See supra note 210. This should be compared 
to hearings before the Department of the Environment where attorneys usually 
are present. Additionally, MV A hearsay regulations should recognize that 
hearsay should not be treated the same in all MV A adjudications. For example, 
hearings involving complaints against dealers might treat hearsay differently 
than hearings involving the assessment of points against a driver. See supra 
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OAH may find that it is possible to develop guidelines that relate to 
a group of agencies or group of adjudications. On the other hand, 
some agency adjudications under OAH may need their own hearsay 
guidelines and concomitant procedural rules. 280 
The adoption of hearsay guidelines by the agencies should have 
an impact on judicial review of administrative decisions based on 
hearsay. In the future, after the guidelines are in place, the major 
judicial inquiry will be whether the agency reasonably applied its 
guidelines and properly followed its procedures. This should simplify 
judicial review by avoiding the fact specific analysis of earlier cases. 
It would also add predictability to the judicial review process and 
hopefully avoid the inconsistent ad hoc approach that plagued earlier 
decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
State administrative agencies should be permitted to rely on 
hearsay in reaching a decision. Refusing to consider hearsay would 
be counterproductive to the goals of the administrative process. When 
notes 209-214 and accompanying text. Moreover, the reliability of medical 
reports would be most relevant to MY A Medical Advisory Board decisions. 
See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text. 
Another illustration involves the Department of Health and Mental Hy-
giene. Although most agency decisions need be supported only by the prepon-
derance of the evidence, some decisions from DHMH must be supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. For example, under MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH 
Occ. § 14-405(b) (1991), factual findings by the Board of Physician Quality 
Assurance relating to disciplinary actions against physicians must be supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. Hearsay guidelines for such hearings should 
take this into consideration. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text. 
Accord MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 7-503(e) (1990) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence for involuntary admission of a person to a state residential 
center for mental retardation); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-1407(1)(2) 
(1990 & Supp. 1992) (requiring clear and convincing evidence in hearings 
assessing monetary penalties against nursing homes). 
In many adjudications before OAH, credibility is not a major concern. In 
MY A hearings concerning suspension of a license, MY A documents are the 
major source of evidence. On the other hand, in a Human Relations Com-
mission matter involving employment or sex discrimination, issues of credibility 
are crucial. Hearing guidelines for OAH should take this into account. 
Not all OAH hearings are adversarial. Hearings for the Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene which are aimed at deciding what is "best" for 
the patient, such as forced medication issues, might take this nonadversarial 
nature into account when developing hearsay rules. 
280. OAH has the statutory authority to implement the suggestions in this article. 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 9-1604(a)(8) (Supp. 1992) requires the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge to develop model rules of procedure and other 
guidelines for administrative hearings. 
50 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
an agency decision is based solely on hearsay, however, the hearsay 
must be reliable in order to ensure fundamental fairness. Agencies 
should adopt guidelines that govern the treatment of hearsay so that 
unreliable hearsay will not be considered. Such guidelines should take 
into account factors unique to the particular agency and the particular 
adjudication. In addition, agencies should promulgate procedural 
rules to help safeguard a party's right to test the reliability of the 
evidence offered at the hearing. Adoption of the suggestions set forth 
in this Article will provide guidance to parties and agency personnel, 
and result in simpler, more consistent judicial review. 
